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1. The	 Problematic	 Evolution	 of	 Environmental	 Protection	 in	EU	Law	
A State has several responsibilities and functions. Some of the responsibilities have been 
framed by the State itself, and some have been imposed on the Member State by the European 
Union (hereinafter the EU). One responsibility that first began as something that the EU did 
not pay much attention to was environmental protection and sustainable development, and 
how public procurement procedures could be used in order to carry out environmentally 
friendly measures in practice. This changed over time and as the EU 2020 goals were 
introduced, it became clear that environmental protection, sustainable development and 
“green procurement” have evolved into one of the major focuses of EU. This can also be seen 
in the reform of the public procurement directives. In 2014, the EU adopted three new 
directives on public procurement.1 The new directives imposes, amongst other things, a 
horizontal clause saying that in the performance of public contracts enterprises have to 
comply with the applicable environmental obligations stemming from EU, international and 
national law. 2  In other words, Member States are obliged to take environmental 
considerations into account when it is carrying out a public procurement procedure. However, 
this has forced the EU and its Member States to face many difficult questions. One of them is 
how green clauses, that is to say environmental requirements, could be used as award criteria 
in a public procurement procedure without this being regarded as state aid, as the use of such 
green clauses imposes additional costs on the tenderer,3 which means that the winning 
tenderer will be granted a benefit through the use of the environmental award criterion that 
																																																								1	Directive	2014/23/EU	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	26	February	2014	on	the	award	of	concession	contracts	Text	with	EEA	relevance,	OJ	L	94,	28.3.2014,	p.	1–64;	Directive	2014/24/EU	of	the	European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 26	February	 2014	 on	 public	 procurement	 and	 repealing	Directive	2004/18/EC	Text	with	EEA	relevance,	OJ	L	94,	28.3.2014,	p.	65–242;	and	Directive	2014/25/EU	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	26	February	2014	on	procurement	by	entities	operating	in	the	water,	energy,	transport	and	postal	services	sectors	and	repealing	Directive	2004/17/EC	Text	with	EEA	relevance,	OJ	L	94,	28.3.2014,	p.	243–374.	2	The	obligation	is	found	in	point	91	in	the	preamble	to	Directive	2014/24/EU,	as	well	as	in	Article	18.2	in	the	same	Directive,	which	lists	the	principles	of	procurement	and	where	it	is	stated	that	”Member	States	shall	take	appropriate	measures	to	ensure	that	in	the	performance	of	public	contracts	economic	operators	comply	with	 applicable	 obligations	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 environmental,	 social	 and	 labour	 law	 established	 by	Union	 law,	national	 law,	 collective	agreements	or	by	 the	 international	 environmental,	 social	 and	 labour	law	provisions	listed	in	Annex	X”.	3	Vedder,	 H.	 (2003).	 Competition	 Law	 and	 Environmental	 Protection	 in	 Europe;	 Towards	 Sustainability?	Groningen:	Europa	Law	Publishing.	Pages	45-46.	
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should not have been used by a private market investor. Hence, the measure will not pass the 
market economy investor principle (further referred to as the MEIP).4 
 
The MEIP is used in order to decide if a benefit or advantage in the meaning of Article 107 
(1) TFEU is at hand. The principle states that if the Member State acts in the same way as a 
private investor would have done, the prohibition of state aid in Article 107 (1) TFEU is not 
applicable. In other words, the question is whether the benefit or advantage could have been 
obtained under normal market conditions, and if it could not, state aid is at hand. Hence, only 
a micro-economic approach is used in order to decide if a benefit or advantage is at hand, 
whilst macro-economic aspects, such as environmental protection, are not to be taken into 
consideration when carrying out the assessment under the MEIP. This creates a problem when 
it comes to green clauses in a public procurement procedure due to the fact that the Member 
State always has to consider aspects of macro-economic nature, such as environmental 
protection, in everything that they do, especially after the introduction of the new directives 
on public procurement. This applies specifically to the area of public procurement, as the aim 
of any purchase through a public procurement procedure is to satisfy public needs in one way 
or another.5 Thus, it is rather questionable if the MEIP actually is a suitable test that should be 
used in order to decide if a measure such as green clauses should be regarded as state aid, as 
the design of the MEIP that is used today automatically classifies measures as such as a 
benefit or advantage. In other words, the MEIP makes it hard (or even impossible) for the 
Member States to use environmental requirements as award criteria in a public tender 
procedure, because environmental considerations is a macro-economic aspect that will not be 
included in the MEIP. Hence, the use of green clauses will always fail the test, which is 
problematic as the bigger picture shows that environmental considerations have to be taken 
into account by the Member States as well as the EU itself. Thus, the MEIP has to be 
amended.  
1.1 Aim	
The aim is to examine the incompatibility of the use of green clauses in a public procurement 
procedure with the MEIP, and thereafter present a new solution that could perhaps be an 
alternative to the MEIP, as the green clauses cannot be used in a public procurement without 																																																								4	See	also	Doern,	A.	(2004).	The	Interaction	Between	EC	Rules	on	Public	Procurement	and	State	Aid.	Public	Procurement	Law	Review.	3.97.	Pages	10-14.	5	Hancher,	 L.,	 Ottervanger,	 T.,	 and	 Jan	 Slot,	 P.	 (2006).	 EC	 State	 Aids.	 (Third	 Edition).	 London:	 Sweet	 &	Maxwell.	Page	13.	
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being regarded as a benefit or advantage because of the design of the MEIP today. This will 
be done by firstly analysing how the MEIP works today, and secondly how the conflict 
between environmental protection and competition is handled in other areas, and levels, of 
EU law.  
1.2 Thesis	Statement	
The MEIP is not a suitable test to apply on cases concerning green clauses used as award 
criteria in a public procurement procedure, as it is not compatible with the environmental 
obligations deriving from EU legislation. The MEIP is hence out of date and has to be 
replaced by an alternative method for deciding when a measure constitutes a benefit or 
advantage in the meaning of Article 107 (1) TFEU, in order to be able to achieve both the 
goals of free competition and environmental protection at the same time.  
1.3 Theory	and	Method	
The materials that have been used are acknowledged legal works such as relevant Treaties and 
directives, judgments from the CJEU, and recognised doctrines and articles by legal scholars. 
To begin with, as the thesis focuses on EU level, only sources that can be used for the EU in 
general have been processed. In order to acquire the background information needed, several 
textbooks within the fields of state aid, public procurement, environmental law as well as 
competition and EU law in general have been used. In addition, other relevant legal sources 
such as directives, communications, case law from the CJEU and other work provided from 
the different EU institutions for guidance purposes have also been used to collect necessary 
background information. 
 
In order to present a new test for determining when a benefit or advantage is at hand, the 
incompatibility and difficulties between the MEIP and the use of green criteria in a public 
procurement procedure have to be analysed. Thus, a legal dogmatic method has been used in 
order to critically analyse the MEIP; by examining how the legal framework looks today, the 
flaws and problems in it will be easy to detect when putting it in relation to the environmental 
obligations. A legal dogmatic method in this context thus means a study of how the MEIP 
works in relation to environmental protection, which is done by looking at the legal 
framework consisting of Treaties, case law, communications, guidelines as well as legal 
literature. The legal dogmatic method is a common method used in order to analyse and 
interpret the legal sources. By using the legal dogmatic method, the problem (or differently 
put, the legal question) will disclose itself, and in this specific case it will also be clear that the 
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legal framework is dysfunctional and thereby how the question at hand is, or rather is not, 
handled in the legal sources. A free argumentation has been used throughout the whole thesis, 
meaning that depending on the matter that is being processed, an interpretation that is suitable 
for the matter has been used. For instance, when it has been necessary to look at the 
underlying aim of a certain provision or principle, a teleological interpretation has been used, 
or when there has been no guidance found on the question at hand, analogies from closely 
related areas of law have been done.  
 
Throughout the analysing chapters, a de lege ferenda approach has also been used. This 
means, inter alia, that the analyses include other existing, yet not practiced, solutions to the 
problem with the MEIP. In addition, other areas of law have been looked upon in order to find 
guidance on how the problem should or could be handled; hence, various legal sources have 
been examined in order to see how the MEIP should be designed. From this, an assessment 
and a discussion of the suitability of those alternative solutions follows, where mostly a 
teleological interpretation has been applied due to the fact that it is through the objective and 
aim of the Union that environmental protection can be integrated to competition law.  
 
In other words, from the examination of the legal system today, a result in the form of 
different problems and flaws with the MEIP was found. It has then been examined whether 
there are any other proposals or other areas of law that could provide guidance in the question 
at hand. Finally, a new test has been developed in a way so that it should remedy those 
problems, or in other words, the new test was designed in a way that it should be, thus a de 
lege ferenda approach was used here as well, taking into account the guidance found in the 
analyses done.  
 
Due to the economical nature of the subject, economic analyses of the law were needed. 
Hence, the classical free market economic theory as well as microeconomic theory were 
applied where it was required, for instance when determining what the components of the 
MEIP actually are as well as when the new test was taken form. Here, the classical free 
market theory refers to the theory once formed by Adam Smith, and specifically regarding the 
questions that will be touched upon below, the classical free market economic theory has 
provided two important propositions that were held throughout the thesis. Firstly, a market 
functions best where it can regulate itself and hence the state should only intervene where 
	 	 5	
there is a public need or market failure.6 Secondly, the actors on the market that supply what 
the consumers demand will remain on the market whilst the uncompetitive actors will be 
removed from the market.7 As to what concerns the microeconomic theory, the statement 
stemming from the theory saying that companies will allocate their limited resources in a way 
that it will generate the maximum profit possible in return will also be used as an assumption 
in the following.8 Consequently, not all components in the mentioned theories have been used 
in the thesis, but instead only the factors necessary in order to solve the questions at hand 
have been included in the work done.  
1.4 Delimitations	
As mentioned, the thesis will only examine how the question is, or should be, handled at EU 
level and therefore there will not be any information that is linked to, or only relevant for, one 
specific Member State.  
 
Due to the basic fact that none of the existing exceptions to the prohibition of state aid are 
applicable on the measure concerned in this thesis, the exceptions will neither be presented 
nor further analysed and discussed. This includes all exceptions there is, namely Article 106 
(2) TFEU, Article 107 (2) and (3) TFEU, the De Minimis Regulation9 and the General Block 
Exemption Regulation (the GBER).10 Article 106 (2) TFEU is only an exemption from the 
state aid rules when the measure at hand constitutes a service of general economic interest 
(henceforth referred to as an SGEI), which the thesis does not touch upon. To be more 
specific, if the measure is an SGEI, it will be compatible with the internal market, hence with 
the state aid rules as well. Regarding Article 107 (2) TFEU, none of the situations listed in the 
provision concerns environmental protection and it is therefore not applicable. On the other 
hand, Article 107 (3) (c) TFEU actually covers aid for environmental protection, however the 
exemption does not cover the situation of the specific measure that shall be examined in the 																																																								6	See	 Hollander,	 S.	 (1987).	Classical	Economics.	 Oxford:	 Basil	 Blackwell.	 Pages	 27-29;	 Hultkrantz,	 L	 and	Söderström,	H.	T.	(2011).	Marknad	&	Politik.	(Ninth	Edition).	Stockholm:	SNS	Förlag.	Page	256.	7	ibid,	Hollander,	S.	Pages	27-29	and	60f.	8	Perloff,	 J.M.	 (2008).	Microeconomics	 –	 Theory	 and	 Applications	 with	 Calculus.	 (First	 Edition).	 Boston:	Pearson/Addison	Wesley.	Page	1f.	9	Commission	Regulation	(EU)	No	1407/2013	of	18	December	2013	on	the	application	of	Articles	107	and	108	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	to	de	minimis	aid	Text	with	EEA	relevance,	OJ	L	352,	24.12.2013,	p.	1–8.	10	Commission	 Regulation	 (EU)	 No	 651/2014	 of	 17	 June	 2014	 declaring	 certain	 categories	 of	 aid	compatible	with	 the	 internal	market	 in	application	of	Articles	107	and	108	of	 the	Treaty	Text	with	EEA	relevance,	OJ	L	187,	26.6.2014,	p.	1–78.	
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following. Instead, the Article covers, inter alia, aid for waste management, aid involved in 
tradable permit schemes and aid for environmental protection beyond EU standards;11 it could 
of course be the case that an award criterion actually aims to improve the environment to a 
greater extent than what is required by EU, however as the thesis shall cover environmental 
award criteria as such, it shall not be discussed or taken into account here. Thus, the starting 
point for the thesis is that Article 107 (3) (c) TFEU is not applicable, and shall therefore not 
be discussed further. As to what regards the De Minimis Regulation, the aid is only exempted 
from the state aid rules if it amounts to less than EUR 200 000 over three years or, if the aid 
has the form of a guarantee, EUR 1,5 million, and since there is no such limit in this thesis, 
the regulation will not be taken into consideration. It should also be mentioned that the 
abovementioned exemptions are not derogations from the notification requirement in Article 
108 (3) TFEU, which states that all measures must be notified to the Commission before they 
are implemented. This also implies that the Member States cannot carry out the measure at 
hand because of the standstill obligation that also follows from Article 108 (3) TFEU. In 
addition, there is the GBER, which is an automatic exemption from Article 108 (3) TFEU. 
However, due to the requirement that the measure should have an incentive effect in Article 6 
of the GBER, it is not applicable on the measure that is examined here.  
 
The regime of public procurement covers a broad range of questions, hence everything will 
not, and should not, be touched upon in this thesis. The main point of interest regarding public 
procurement is the system of award criteria, thus only the relevant parts that cover the award 
criteria will be used. In addition, only Directive 2014/24/EU will be used, as this is the 
relevant directive in this respect; the old directives will not have any effect after April 2016 
and it would therefore be of limited interest to include them in the thesis, hence they will not 
be discussed to a greater extent than to serve as a comparison to the new directives. In 
addition, the two other directives that are included in the 2014 public procurement reform, 
namely Directive 2014/23/EU and Directive 2014/25/EU, contain the same rules as Directive 
2014/24/EU, however the rules are not as strict as in the Directive 2014/24/EU. Thus, if a 
measure is compatible with Directive 2014/24/EU, it will be compatible with the other two 
directives as well. As a result, only Directive 2014/24/EU shall be used (which from now on 
will be referred to as the Directive). As the awarding process for the open and the restricted 
																																																								11	For	a	full	discussion	on	the	matter,	please	see	Bacon,	K.	(2009).	European	Community	Law	of	State	Aid.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	Inc..	Pages	182-190.	
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procedures looks the same, there is no need to separate the two. Thus, the benchmark will be 
both an open and a restricted procedure in the following.  
1.5 Arrangement	of	the	Material	
As will be shown below, the CJEU has settled that the MEIP has to be used when assessing if 
state aid is at hand, at the same time as the EU has imposed an obligation for the Member 
States to take environmental aspects into consideration when carrying out a tender procedure. 
However, the two obligations are extremely hard to achieve at the same time, as the MEIP 
cannot include environmental aspects in the way that the principle is designed today. Hence, 
an amendment or perhaps a complete removal of the principle is required in order to integrate 
the two areas to the fullest. Due to the complexity of the question, relevant background 
information is needed, which will be presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 will then analyse what 
changes that have to be done, by looking at the actual problem of the MEIP today. 
Furthermore, in order to understand the width of the problem of environmental protection’s 
incompatibility with the strong principle of free competition, an analysis of the two areas and 
the conflict between them will be done in Chapter 4, where it will also be examined if any 
guidance can be found from how the problem is handled within the areas of state aid and 
public procurement, within competition law in general as well as on Treaty level. Chapter 5 
will then present the essential conclusions that can be drawn from the foregoing chapters, 
hence the chapter has partly a pedagogical aim, to summarise the conclusions that has been 
done throughout the chapters for the reader, and partly the aim of introducing the underlying 
reason to why the MEIP has to be replaced. The replacement of the MEIP will be presented in 
Chapter 6, which will also include an examination of what the potential problems may be with 
the new principle. Last but not least, Chapter 7 aims to string everything together in a final 
conclusion.  
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2. The	Trilateral	Problem	–	Background	Information		
As the thesis aims to propose a solution to the problems that derive from the use of the MEIP 
on green clauses in a public procurement procedure, it will touch upon two major regimes 
within EU competition law, namely state aid and public procurement. In addition, a third 
regime in the form of EU environmental law, or more specifically the principle of sustainable 
development, will have to be taken into account in order to settle the problem. The three 
regimes are complex when looked upon one by one; hence a problem that contains all three 
regimes will inevitably be confusing and ambiguous. It is therefore necessary to provide the 
reader with an overview of the three regimes, including the key aspects of each one, and 
finally to explain how they interact (or maybe in this specific case, do not interact) with each 
other. 
2.1	State	Aid		
In 2012, the rules on state aid were modernised in order to focus the scope of the rules on the 
enforcement of the common interests of the EU, as well as to target market failures and to 
improve the procedures connected to state aid control.12 The rules on state aid are found in 
Articles 107 to 109 TFEU, where the central prohibition is found in Article 107 (1) TFEU. As 
will be described further below, measures that constitute state aid can affect the cross-border 
trade to a great extent.  
2.1.1	Purpose	of	the	EU	state	aid	regime		
The EU was once established primarily in order to create an internal market. Hence, the one 
single objective that the EU and almost all its activities are based upon is free competition. 
The rules on state aid found in the TFEU aim to remove the possibility of state interference, 
as this causes sometimes severe distortion of competition.13 The control and monitoring of 
state aid by the Commission and the CJEU has been alleged to only focus on the purpose of 
protecting the internal market and competition from measures that are against the common 
interest of the EU, however the purpose of the regulations is also to pursue different goals set 
by the EU. For example, this can be seen in the rules and regulations that the Commission 
uses in order to evaluate different types of state aid.14 Thus, the purpose of the regulation of 																																																								12	Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	Council,	The	European	Economic	and	 Social	 Committee	 and	 the	 Committee	 of	 the	 Regions	 EU	 State	 Aid	 Modernisation	 (SAM)	(COM/2012/0209	final	of	8.5.2012).		13	Heidenhain,	M.	(2010).	European	State	Aid	Law:	A	Handbook.	Munich:	Beck.	Page	1.	14	ibid,	pages	4-5.	
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state aid is to control the Member States’ interference with competition, in order to pursue 
common goals set by the EU.  
2.1.2	Article	107	(1)	TFEU	
According to Article 107 (1) TFEU, any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects 
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market. The CJEU has not 
ruled upon a consistent definition of what the exact conditions for state aid under Article 107 
(1) TFEU are, and the Court usually uses the actual wording of the Article.15 This has resulted 
in different interpretations in the legal literature. One of the most common usages of the 
conditions proposes that there are four cumulative conditions, which will also be used in the 
following:  
 
1. The aid has to confer an economic advantage or benefit on the undertaking; 
2. The aid has to be granted by the State or through State resources; 
3. The aid has to be selective; and 
4. The aid must distort or threaten to distort competition and affect intrastate trade.16 
 
It should also be pointed out that the ECJ has established that the scope of Article 107 (1) 
TFEU does not only cover pure grants or subsidies, but all measures that are likely to directly 
or indirectly favour certain economic operators shall be regarded as state aid within the 
meaning of the Article.17 Thus, the assessment whether a measure constitutes state aid focuses 
on the effects of the measure at hand, and no regard is taken to whether the purpose or aim of 
the measure conducted by the Member State was to favour a certain undertaking or not.18  
 
Even though it is only the first criterion that concerns the aim and purpose of this thesis due to 
the fact that the MEIP is used to determine if the first criterion is fulfilled or not, all four 
criteria will be explained and discussed further in order to provide a complete picture of the 																																																								15	Bacon,	K.	(2009).	European	Community	Law	of	State	Aid.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	Inc..	Page	24	16	ibid.	 See	 also	 the	 case	 Altmark	 Trans	 GmbH,	 C-280/00,	 ECLI:EU:C:2003:13	 para.	 74-75;	 Belgium	 v	
Commission	 (Tubemeuse),	 C-142/87,	 ECLI:EU:C:1990:125,	 para.	 25;	 Spain	v	Commission,	 Joined	 Cases	 C-278/92	 to	 C-280/92,	 ECLI:EU:C:1994:325,	 para.	 20;	 and	 France	 v	 Commission,	 C-482/99,	ECLI:EU:2002:294,	para.	68.	17	Altmark	Trans	GmbH,	C-280/00,	ECLI:EU:C:2003:13	para.	84.	18	French	Republic	v	European	Commission,	C-559/12	P,	ECLI:EU:C:2014:217,	para.	95.	
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state aid scheme for the reader.  
(i)	“The	aid	has	to	confer	an	economic	advantage	or	benefit	on	the	undertaking”		
Due to its complex assessment, the first criterion has been vividly discussed and has also 
given rise to an extensive case law from the CJEU. As all measures have to be analysed in 
terms of their effects, measures other than straightforward subsidies and grants sometimes 
cause major problems when determining if a benefit or advantage is at hand, or in other words 
if an undertaking has been favoured.19 However, it is clear that if an undertaking receives a 
benefit it would not have obtained under normal market conditions, the first criterion of the 
Article is fulfilled.20 In order to determine if this is the case, the CJEU has developed a test 
called the market economy investor principle (the MEIP).21 The MEIP has been used by the 
CJEU since the 1980’s in order to determine whether an advantage or benefit has been 
conferred on an undertaking,22 however it was not until the recent case European Commission 
vs Électricité de France (EDF)23 that the Court ruled that the MEIP is a test that is required to 
be used by the Commission when determining if the first criterion of Article 107 (1) TFEU is 
fulfilled. The Court stated:  
 
[...] contrary to the assertions made by the Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority, 
the private investor test is not an exception which applies only if a Member State so requests, 
in situations characterised by all the constituent elements of State aid incompatible with the 
common market, as laid down in [Article 107(1) TFEU] [...] where it is applicable, that test 
is among the factors which the Commission is required to take into account for the 
purposes of establishing the existence of such aid” (emphasis added).24 
 
The test examines if the Member State acts in the same way as a private investor would have 
done, and if it has, state aid is not at hand and Article 107 (1) TFEU is not applicable. In other 
words, the test looks at whether the benefit or advantage received by an undertaking would 																																																								19	Bacon,	K.	(2009).	European	Community	Law	of	State	Aid.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	Inc..	Page	29.	20	AG	 Jacobs	 in	Déménagements-Manutention	Transport	 SA	 (DMT),	 C-256/97,	 ECLI:EU:C:1998:436,	 para.	31.	21	There	are	several	names	used	to	describe	the	test,	however	the	name	”MEIP”	is	used	here.	22 La	 Poste,	 C-39/94,	 ECLI:EU:C:1996:285,	 para.	 60;	 Belgium	 v	 Commission,	 Case	 234/84,	ECLI:EU:C:1986:302,	para.	13;	Belgium	v	Commission,	Case	40/85,	ECLI:EU:C:1986:305,	para.	13;	and	Van	
der	Kooy,	Joined	cases	67,	68	and	70/85,	ECLI:EU:C:1988:38,	para.	28.	23	European	Commission	v	Électricité	de	France	(EDF),	C-124/10	P,	ECLI:EU:C:2012:318,	para.	103-104.	24	ibid,	para.	103.	
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have been obtained from a market investor at normal market conditions. It is therefore of 
great importance to separate when the State acts as a public authority, which it does for 
instance when it adopts new legislation, collect taxes or promotes social security in different 
forms, and when the State acts as an investor, because there will not be a ‘normal market’ 
where the State acts as a public authority.25 Put differently, only micro-economic aspects are 
to be taken into account when applying the MEIP. Micro-economic aspects include 
commercial considerations only, where the primary objective is to make profit,26 hence 
“leaving aside all social, regional-policy and sectorial considerations”.27 Thus, the starting 
point is that a private investor would not consider environmental consideration when carrying 
out its business. On the contrary, macro-economic aspects take account to the economy as a 
whole, hence other policies such as social and environmental aspects are being included and 
prioritised. Thus, when the MEIP is applied, “the State may not rely on social costs such as 
the cost of redundancies and payment of unemployment benefits, which do not devolve on the 
State as a shareholder but are incurred by the State as a public authority”28. The concept of 
micro- versus macro-economic aspects will be discussed further in Chapter 3 below.   
(ii)	“The	aid	has	to	be	granted	by	the	State	or	through	State	resources”	
The ECJ has held that cases concerning aid that has been granted directly by the State and 
cases where the aid has been granted by public or private bodies that have been established in 
any way by the state should not be separated.29 In other words, any regional or local authority 
that is directly or indirectly in connection with the State falls within the scope of the concept 
of “state”.30 In addition, the aid has to be imputable to the State in order for the criterion to be 
fulfilled. This is a simple assessment when the aid derives from for example legislation, since 
it is only the State that has the legislative power; hence it is imputable to the State. However, 
when the measure has been granted through for instance a company, which is publically 
owned, the question is not as easy. The Court has established that decisions that are taken in 																																																								25	Bacon,	K.	(2009).	European	Community	Law	of	State	Aid.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	Inc..	Page	30.	26	Linde,	T-98/00,	ECLI:EU:T:2002:248,	para.	49;	Westdeutsche	Landesbank	v	Commission,	 Joined	cases	T-228/99	and	T-233/99,	ECLI:EU:T:2003:57		para.	245.	27	Kingdom	of	Belgium	v	Commission	of	 the	European	Communities,	 C-234/84,	 ECLI:EU:C:1986:302,	 para.	14.	28	Bacon,	K.	(2009).	European	Community	Law	of	State	Aid.	 	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	Inc..	Page	45;	
Commission	v	Italy,	Case	118/85,	ECLI:EU:C:1987:283,	para.	7.	29	Steinike	&	Weinlig,	Case	78/76,	ECLI:EU:C:1977:52,	para.	21;	Commission	of	the	European	Communities	v	
French	Republic,	Case	290/83,	ECLI:EU:C:1985:37,	para.	14.	30 Federal	 Republic	 of	 Germany	 v	 Commission	 of	 the	 European	 Communities,	 Case	 248/84,	ECLI:EU:C:1987:436,	para.	17.	
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the day-to-day business of a public undertaking cannot be regarded as state aid within the 
meaning of Article 107 (1) TFEU unless interference by the public authorities can be 
shown.31 Thus, the public authority has to be involved in the adoption of the measure in order 
for the criterion to be met. Due to the difficulties that the criterion has caused, the CJEU has 
presented extensive case law that discusses where the line should be drawn and how the 
assessment is carried out in different cases. Some factors that the CJEU has looked upon 
when examining if the aid is imputable to the State concerns the way the undertaking was 
established32 and its legal status,33 if the measure was subject to the approval from the public 
authorities34 and to what extent the undertaking is under supervision of a public authority.35 
(iii)	“The	aid	has	to	be	selective”	
As regards the selectivity of the aid, it is found in the wording of Article 107 (1) TFEU, 
namely “favour certain undertakings”. In order for state aid to be at hand, the measure has to 
be selective in nature and only address one or a fixed group of undertakings. The selectivity 
criterion is probably the hardest one to apply in practice, as not all measures that favour 
certain undertakings will fall within the scope of Article 107 (1) TFEU.36 Bacon suggests that 
this is caused by two different reasons. Firstly, he states that the fact that a measure will only 
favour certain undertakings may be an incidental effect of a general measure that is in fact 
applied on all undertakings. Secondly, the variety in treatment of an undertaking may be 
justified by the nature and scheme of the system.37 This means that the nature of a measure 
will sometimes treat undertakings differently, simply because that is how the system works. 
For example, in a tax system, the taxpayers whom pay a higher rate due to their higher 
income cannot claim that the taxpayers whom are paying taxes at a lower rate are benefitting 
from state aid, as this is the nature of the system.38  
 
 
																																																								31	France	v	Commission	(“Stardust	Marine”),	C-482/99,	ECLI:EU:C:2002:294;	see	also	AG	Jacobs	opinion	in	the	same	case	ECLI:EU:C:2001:685,	para.	55.	32	See	for	example	Decision	2006/513/EC	Berlin-Brandenburg	DTT,	para.	53.	33	France	v	Commission	(“Stardust	Marine”),	C-482/99,	ECLI:EU:C:2002:294,	para.	56.	34	ibid.	35	Decision	2006/513/EC	Berlin-Brandenburg	DTT,	para.	53;	Bacon,	K.	 (2009).	European	Community	Law	
of	State	Aid.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	Inc..	Page	78.	36	ibid,	Bacon,	K.	Page	80.	37	ibid,	Bacon,	K.	Page	90;	Italy	v	Commission,	Case	173/73,	ECLI:EU:C:1974:71,	para.	15.	38	ibid,	Bacon,	K.	Page	90.	
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(iv)	“The	aid	must	distort	or	threaten	to	distort	competition	and	affect	intrastate	trade”	
The final criterion of Article 107 (1) TFEU is actually two conditions that are often 
considered to be related and should therefore be assessed together.39 The key elements of the 
fourth criterion is firstly to determine whether the competition has been distorted and 
secondly if intrastate trade have been affected, which is done by assessing if the measure has 
strengthened the position of the recipient undertaking in relation to its competitors.40 
However, no regard is taken to the weakened position of the competitors, but instead it is 
enough to show that the position of the recipient undertaking has been strengthened in order 
for the criterion to be fulfilled.41 This is because, as can be understood by the wording of the 
criterion, it is enough that the distortion of competition is potential; no actual effect is 
required.  
2.2	Public	Procurement	
More than 250 000 public entities in the EU spend approximately 18% of its GDP on 
purchasing services, goods and works each year.42 Hence, it is clear that the value of these 
contracts are high and if a public procurement procedure is not carried out in accordance with 
EU law, it may have devastating effects on the internal market. One of the core values of the 
EU is the internal market, and all businesses, no matter where in the EU they are established, 
have the right to participate in tender procedures in all Member States. In order to maintain a 
level playing field, the EU has introduced rules on public procurement in the form of 
directives. The directives cover a large spectrum of rules, which apply to different stages in a 
tender procedure, as well as objectives and principles that the Member States have to follow 
when a public procurement procedure is carried out. One of the most difficult things that are 
expected from the Member States in the directives is to determine what criteria that can be 
used in the different stages of the tender procedure without it violating for instance the state 
aid rules. As the EU institutions have not yet provided enough guidance on the matter, it has 
caused a lot of confusion and discussion among the Member States and the EU institutions. 
Thus, the following sections aim at clarifying the area of public procurement that concern the 																																																								39	ibid,	 Bacon,	 K.	 Page	 93;	Mauro	Alzetta	v	Commission,	 Joined	 cases	 T-298/97,	 T-312/97,	 T-313/97,	 T-315/97,	T-600/97	to	607/97,	T-1/98,	T-3/98	to	T-6/98	and	T-23/98,	ECLI:EU:T:151,	para.	14.	40	Philip	Morris,	 Case	 730/79,	 ECLI:EU:C:1980:209,	 para.	 11;	Kingdom	of	 Belgium	and	 Forum	187	ASBL,	Joined	cases	C-182/03	and	C-217/03,	ECLI:EU:C:2006:416,	para.	131.	41AG	Darmon	in	Firma	Sloman	Neptun	Schiffahrts,	Joined	cases	C-72/91	and	C-73/91,	ECLI:EU:C:1992:139,	para.	61.	42	Europa.eu.	Rules	and	Procedures.	Accessed	21st	September	2015.		<http://europa.eu/youreurope/business/public-tenders/rules-procedures/index_en.htm>.		
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three different categories of criteria that are used in a public procurement procedure, as well 
as the background information regarding the key principles used in public procurement 
procedures by the EU and its Member States.  
2.2.1	The	main	purpose	and	principles	of	EU	public	procurement	law	
The main goal of regulating public procurement procedures is to remove obstacles to the free 
movement of goods and services, or in other words to enhance the internal market and fair 
competition.43 All companies within the borders of the EU should be able to compete on the 
same conditions in order to win a public contract through a public procurement procedure. In 
order to achieve the main goal, the institutions of the EU have established five primary 
principles that have to be followed when conducting a public tender procedure, which are 
found in Article 36 in the Directive: 
 
1. Equal treatment  
2. Transparency  
3. Non-discrimination  
4. Proportionality  
5. Mutual recognition  
 
However, not all of the abovementioned objectives can be achieved at the same time, and not 
all of them are equally desirable.44 When looking at the CJEU’s case law as well as the 
dominant opinion in the doctrine, it is clear that equal treatment and transparency are the most 
important ones. However, Member States have used public procurement procedures as a tool 
to pursue non-economic goals, such as environmental, social, labour-keeping policies etc. 
(henceforth referred to as secondary criteria) in addition to the main goals stated above, which 
have given rise to different problems. The secondary criteria distort competition, and thereby 
the main objective of public procurement rules is jeopardised, due to the fact that in many 
cases the secondary criterion at hand is completely unrelated to the main goals of public 
procurement and decreases the effectiveness of the procedure. Hence, it has been submitted in 
the doctrines and articles that secondary criteria, such as environmental protection, should be 
																																																								43	Sánchez	 Graells,	 A.	 (2011).	 Public	 Procurement	 and	 the	 EU	 Competition	 Rules.	 United	 Kingdom:	 Hart	Publishing.	Page	81.	44	ibid,	page	98.	
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abandoned or separated from public procurement procedures and be left to other areas of law 
(such as tax, labour and environmental law).45 As Albert Sánchez Graells puts it: 
 
“If it is correct to assume that both competition law and public procurement rules are 
primarily concerned with economic efficiency (as is understood here), and that undistorted 
competition is their shared and basic goal, competition criteria should be given preference 
when competition clashes with other objectives. Therefore, substantial revision of the pursuit 
of secondary policies in public procurement seems to be a must for a more competition-
oriented procurement”.46 
2.2.2	The	new	directives	
It should also be mentioned that the EU has adopted new directives on public procurement in 
2014, including the Directive together with two other directives, which replaces the old 
directives47 when the implementation is complete.48 Together with the launching of the new 
Directive, a new legal status has followed; the new Directive actually imposes a legal 
obligation for the Member States to take environmental aspects into consideration when 
carrying out a tender procedure.   
2.2.2.1	Effects	of	the	new	Directive	
The Directive contains a great deal of novelties, including several provisions that aim at using 
public procurement procedures as an instrument to implement environmental policies. For 
instance, environmental aspects can be used as an award criterion since it, as long as it is 
linked to the subject matter of the contract, 49  falls within the meaning of “the most 
economically advantageous tender” in Article 67 (2) of the Directive.50 In addition, Member 
States have to take appropriate measures when a procurement procedure is carried out in order 
to comply with the provisions and obligations that concern, inter alia, environmental 
																																																								45	Ibid,	pages	97-100	and	pages	110f.	46		ibid,	page	111.	47	Directives	2004/17/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	31	March	2004	coordinating	the	 procurement	 procedures	 of	 entities	 operating	 in	 the	 water,	 energy,	 transport	 and	 postal	 services	sectors,	OJ	L	134,	30.4.2004,	p.	1–113;	and	2004/18/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	31	March	2004	on	the	coordination	of	procedures	for	the	award	of	public	works	contracts,	public	supply	contracts	and	public	service	contracts,	OJ	L	134,	30.4.2004,	p.	114–240.	48	The	implementation	is	to	be	completed	by	the	Member	States	in	April	2016	at	the	latest,	see	Article	90	(1)	in	Directive	2014/24/EU.		49	The	subject	matter	of	the	contract	refers	to	the	performance	specifications.		50	Which	has	been	ruled	on	by	the	ECJ	in	Concordia,	C-513/99,	ECLI:EU:C:2002:495,	para.	64.	
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protection.51 In other words, the new Directive imposes a responsibility on the Member States 
to take environmental considerations into account when a public procurement procedure is 
executed, in comparison to the old directives, which only gave the possibility for Member 
States to use environmental considerations in the awarding process.52 The Commission has 
explained the impact of the new Directive in the environmental area through a published 
factsheet, where the following changes are the main ones:  
• “In the performance of public contracts enterprises have to comply with the applicable 
environmental obligations stemming from EU, international and national law.  
• An enterprise which does not respect these environmental obligations can be excluded 
from the tender procedure.  
• The enterprise that has submitted the best tender may be not awarded the contract if 
the tender does not comply with these environmental obligations.  
• A tender has to be rejected where it is abnormally low in relation to the works, 
supplies or services because it does not comply with these environmental 
obligations”.53  
2.2.3	The	different	criteria	
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, one of the hardest things for the Member 
States is to determine what criteria that can be used at what stage of the procurement 
procedure. Also, there is confusion and therefore an on-going debate regarding what terms 
that should be used, in addition to the meanings of them. The terms are not used in a coherent 
way, and thus the following division and definitions of the different criteria can be discussed. 
Nevertheless, they will be used in following.  
2.2.3.1	Qualification	criteria	
Firstly, there are criteria used at the qualification stage, which are criteria that determine 
which economic operator that may participate in the tender procedure and move on to the next 
stage. The contracting authority may only exclude an economic operator if any of the 
																																																								51	See	Article	18.2	in	the	Directive.	52	Europa.eu.	Environment	–	EU	public	procurement	directives.	Accessed	29	September	2015.		<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/eu_public_directives_en.htm>.		53	Europa.eu.	Public	Procurement	Reform	-	Factsheet	No.	7:	Green	Public	Procurement.	Accessed	29	September	2015.		<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/reform/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-07-environmental_en.pdf	>.		
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situations listed in Article 57 in the Directive is at hand, which includes for example a 
conviction for participation in a criminal organisation or where the economic operator is 
bankrupt. Article 57 includes both obligations for the Member States to exclude certain 
economic operators,54 as well as cases where the Member States have the right to exclude an 
economic operator from participating at all.55 Qualification criteria are not allowed to be used 
in order to exclude a group of undertakings; the purpose of qualification criteria is simply to 
exclude undertakings that the public authorities do not want to cooperate with, for example 
companies that are suspected of money laundering.  
2.2.3.2	Award	criteria	
Secondly, there is award criteria, which are criteria that are used when assessing which tender 
that should be awarded the contract in the procurement procedure and are regulated in Article 
67 in the Directive. Award criteria can be based on two different grounds, either the lowest 
price, or the most economically advantageous tender. The lowest price obviously only awards 
a tenderer based on the offered price, whilst the most economically advantageous tender 
considers various factors, such as price, running costs, product or work quality and cost-
effectiveness. Award criteria are the relevant criteria that are to be examined in the light of the 
MEIP in the following, where the most economically advantageous tender will be focused 
upon.  
 
In addition, award criteria may be divided into two different classes called primary criteria 
and secondary criteria. Primary criteria refer to the core objectives of the tender, which will 
always include the five primary goals of public procurement law stated above, but also those 
that are essential to perform and/or supply for the good or service that is being procured. On 
the contrary, secondary criteria are used to achieve certain goals pursued by the procuring 
entity, such as environmental or social goals.56 Secondary criteria have to be linked to the 
subject matter of the contract, or in other words performance specifications, in order to be 
used, and do not have to be of purely economic factors.57 Differently put, if the criterion used 
is considered to be a requirement that is necessary to perform the service/use the good in 
question, it is regarded as a normal market condition and will therefore be acceptable.  																																																								54	The	obligations	are	found	in	Article	57	(1)	and	(2)	in	the	Directive.	55	See	Article	57	(4)	in	the	Directive.	56	Doern,	 A.	 (2004).	 The	 Interaction	 Between	 EC	 Rules	 on	 Public	 Procurement	 and	 State	 Aid.	 Public	Procurement	Law	Review.	3.97.	Pages	10-11.	57	Concordia,	C-513/99,	ECLI:EU:C:2002:495	para.	59.	
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2.2.3.3	Contract	conditions	
Thirdly, the contracting authority can use contract conditions in order to pursue certain goals. 
Contacting conditions have to be published before the tender procedure begins in order for the 
potential participants to be aware of its existence.58 Similarly to the other forms of criteria, 
secondary criteria used as contact conditions have to be used with caution, as they are not 
allowed to favour certain undertakings due to the fact that it will then fall within the scope of 
Article 107 (1) TFEU.59  
2.3	Environmental	Protection	
The EU has “positioned itself as the world leader in the field of international environmental 
policy”, and sustainable development is today on the top of the EU-agenda.60 The focus on 
climate change and environmental protection within the EU has grown over the years. It has 
developed from the first stage in the early 1970’s when the environment was considered to be 
a task for each of the Member States separately and not for the EU as a whole. However, the 
topic entered the stage when the EU realised that the differences in environmental policies 
among the Member States could cause distortion of competition and thus the question evolved 
into what it is today, when the EU is the main force for improving the environment.61 What 
begun as a solution to another trade barrier has developed into one of the main objectives of 
the EU. Today, environmental protection is seen as an obligation, both for the EU as a whole 
and for the individual Member States, as the provisions in the Treaties, Article 3 (3) TEU and 
Article 11 TFEU, provide that environmental considerations have to be considered by the EU 
and therefore also by its Member States.62 One of the key concepts in EU environmental law 
is sustainable development, which the European Commission has defined as meeting the 
needs of present generations without jeopardizing the ability of future generations to meet 
																																																								58	Gebroeders	Beentjes	BV	v	State	of	the	Netherlands,	Case	31/87,	ECLI:EU:C:1988:422,	para.	36.	59	Commission	v	Kingdom	of	Denmark,	Joined	cases	C-72/91	and	C-73/91,	ECLI:EU:C:1993:97,	para.	26.	60	Kelemen,	 R.D.	 (2007).	 Globalizing	 EU	 Environmental	 Regulation,	 Paper	 prepared	 for	 a	 conference	 on	
Europe	and	the	Management	of	Globalization.	Princeton	University.	Page	1.	61	See	 Scott,	 J.	 (2012).	 The	 Four	 Regimes	 of	 Environmental	 Policy	 in	 EU	 Environmental	 Protection	 –	
European	Law	and	Governance.	United	States:	Oxford	University	Press	 for	 further	 information	about	 the	different	stages	of	the	development	of	the	environmentally	friendly	EU	that	we	have	today.	See	also	Hey,	C.	
EU	 Environmental	 Policies:	 A	 short	 history	 of	 the	 policy	 strategies.	 Accessed	 29	 September	 2015.	<http://home.cerge-ei.cz/richmanova/upces/Hey%20-%20EU%20Environmental%20Policies%20A%20Short%20History%20of%20the%20Policy%20Strategies.pdf>;		 Johnson,	 S.P.	 and	 Corcelle,	 G.	 (1989).	 The	 Environmental	 Policy	 of	 the	 European	 Communities.	London:	Graham	&	Trotman.	62	For	further	information	regarding	the	matter,	please	see	section	4.1.	
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their own needs.63 The concept is not limited to a desire to improve the environment, but 
instead Article 3 TEU lays down other factors that are considered to be a part of sustainable 
development as well, namely balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly 
competitive social market economy, employment and social progress as well as promotion of 
scientific and technological advance. Thus, in order to achieve sustainable development, 
factors of economical, social, environmental and technical nature have to be combined. This 
is important to understand, however as the thesis only concerns the use of environmental 
clauses, it will also be the one factor that will be focused on the most in the following.  
 
The increasing interest and focus on environmental protection can easily be seen in for 
example the EU 2020 goals, where climate change is one out of the five headline targets that 
the EU as a whole has agreed to achieve,64 but also in the way in which the EU is 
implementing the objective of environmental protection in other areas of law, such as in the 
new public procurement directives. In addition to what has been stated above regarding the 
environmental changes in the new Directive, the preamble to the same Directive states:  
 
”Public procurement plays a key role in the Europe 2020 strategy, set out in the Commission 
Communication of 3 March 2010 entitled ‘Europe 2020, a strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth’ (‘Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’), as 
one of the market-based instruments to be used to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth while ensuring the most efficient use of public funds“.65 
 
However, it can still be discussed how the obligation to take environmental considerations 
should be applied. Dhondt proposes that the concept of integration of the environmental 
protection requirement stemming from the Treaties can be argued to have two different 
approaches, namely a weak interpretation and a strong interpretation.66 To begin with, the 
weak interpretation of the obligation suggests that the Member States as well as the EU itself 
have to make an assessment in the form of looking at the degree of compliance of the measure 																																																								63	Ec.europa.eu.	 (17	 September	 2015).	 Sustainable	Development	 –	Environment	 –	European	Commission..	Accessed	24	November	2015.	<	http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/>.	64	Europa.eu.	Europe	2020	Targets.	Accessed	29	September	2015.		<http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/targets/eu-targets/index_en.htm>.	65	See	point	(2)	in	the	preamble	to	Directive	2014/24/EU.	66	Dhondt,	 N.	 (2003).	 Integration	 of	 Environmental	 Protection	 into	 other	 EC	 Policies.	 Groningen:	 Europa	Law	Publishing.	Page	89f.	
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in relation to the environmental protection obligation. However, it is up to the institution that 
is carrying out the measure to decide what should be done with the result from the 
assessment. In other words, the institution would have a wide margin of discretion in the 
matter.67 Secondly, it can be argued that a strong interpretation should be applied on the 
obligation to take environmental considerations into account. The strong interpretation would 
mean that environmental aspects are observed or complied with as other policies and 
activities are carried out. This means that other measures should be adopted in order to pursue 
the goal of environmental protection, which obviously leaves little or almost no margin of 
discretion for the institution that is carrying out the measure in comparison to if a weak 
interpretation is applied.68 Dhondt means that it is the strong interpretation that is the most 
plausible one, as it corresponds to the aim of the principle of sustainable development, the 
case law of the CJEU as well as it follows how other secondary policies have been handled 
before.69 However, it should be noted that a strong interpretation does not imply that 
environmental protection precedes all other objectives of the EU, which will be discussed 
further below.  
2.4	The	Conflict	–	When	is	this	a	Problem?	
From the abovementioned, it is clear that the three regimes have different objectives and 
scopes. The regimes constantly overlap, and it is more or less inevitable that there will be 
tension and conflicts as they interact. The EU has decided to promote and work towards 
sustainable development and environmental protection, and has therefore implemented the 
objective in the different areas where they believe that the goal can be pursued and achieved. 
However, this causes a problem as the principle of the internal market and free competition is 
not purely compatible with the principle of environmental protection as the legal framework 
looks today.  
 
It is clear that the areas of state aid and public procurement is characterised by protection of 
competition in the internal market, as the purpose of the rules is to maintain a level playing 
field in order for competition not to be distorted.70 This can be seen, inter alia, when the 
MEIP is applied as it only embraces purely economic objectives. Environmental protection is 																																																								67	ibid.	page	90f.	68	ibid.	pages	93-98.	69	Some	 of	 these	 reasons	will	 be	 discussed	 further	 in	 section	 4.2.3,	 however	 for	 a	 full	 examination	 and	explanation,	please	see	Dhondt,	N.	 (2003).	 Integration	of	Environmental	Protection	into	other	EC	Policies.	Groningen:	Europa	Law	Publishing.	Pages	100-110.	70	Heidenhain,	M.	(2010).	European	State	Aid	Law:	A	Handbook.	Munich:	Beck.	Page	792.	
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not traditionally seen as an economic consideration, and it is therefore difficult (or perhaps 
impossible?) to integrate environmental policies within these areas. As has been provided for 
in the foregoing sections, the CJEU has settled that the MEIP has to be used when assessing if 
state aid is at hand, at the same time as the Union has imposed an obligation on the Member 
States to take environmental aspects into consideration when carrying out a tender procedure. 
The pursuit of environmental goals in a public procurement procedure may constitute state aid 
because the use of such will provide an advantage in the form of a higher compensation will 
be paid to the undertaking that meets the environmental criteria than what would have been 
paid to an undertaking that does not, which will distort competition and thereby fulfil all four 
criteria in Article 107 (1) TFEU.71 In other words, the use of green clauses in a public 
procurement procedure will constitute a benefit due to the fact that environmental aspects 
cannot be included in the MEIP. There has been several cases before the GC,72 covering 
situations as described, but there is not yet a ruling on the question of how secondary criteria 
in general should be handled in relation to the state aid rules. Thus, it is submitted that as 
environmental protection has evolved into an obligation that has to be considered, the MEIP 
is out of date and has to be amended in order for the Member States to be able to fulfil its 
environmental obligations.  
 
The problem with the application of MEIP on cases concerning public procurement 
procedures can be demonstrated with a concrete, however somewhat simplistic, example. 
Suppose that a Member State decides to conduct a public tender for the purpose of purchasing 
100.000 shirts that are to be used by the personnel working at the public hospital. The 
Member State further decides to use an award criterion with the weighting of 50%, relating to 
the total amount of recycled material used in the shirts, where 100% recycled material will 
give a total of 10 points. In addition, the Member State uses a price criterion weighting 50%, 
where the points awarded will be dependent on the price submitted by the other offers.73 
Thus, the tenderer that offers the lowest price will be given 10 points and the other tenderers 																																																								71	See	 Arrowsmith,	 S.	 and	 Kunzlik,	 P.	 (2009).	 Social	 and	Environmental	 Policies	 in	EC	Procurement	 Law.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	Page	249.	72	For	example,	see	the	case	BAI,	T-14/96,	ECLI:EU:T:1999:12	(which	is	further	discussed	in	section	3.1);	
P&O,	 Joined	 cases	 T-116/01	 and	 T-118/01,	 ECLI:EU:T:2003:217;	 Thermenhotel,	 T-158/99,	ECLI:EU:T2004:2.			73	There	 are	 several	 problems	 to	 this	 method	 of	 awarding	 points	 of	 price	 which	 will	 not	 be	 discussed	further	here,	however	as	it	is	the	most	common	one	it	will	be	used	in	this	example.	See	Practical	Law.	PLC	
–	Evaluation	of	tenders.	Accessed	10	November	2015.		<http://uk.practicallaw.com/2-386-8761?service=publicsector#a406015>.	
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will be given points in relation to that. Hence, the maximum points that can be awarded to an 
undertaking are 20 points.  
 
When applying the MEIP, only commercial considerations can be regarded, hence no 
environmental aspects shall be included. In this case, it would mean that if the winning 
tenderer were awarded the most points based on the environmental criterion, this could be 
deemed to constitute state aid as the tenderer is given a benefit in the form of the award of the 
contract due to the use of the environmental award criterion. This can be exemplified with 
numbers; if there are two tenderers that both offer 100.000 shirts that have been produced 
from 100% recycled material, the price will be the decisive factor to which of the two that 
should be rewarded the contract because both of them will receive 10 points from the 
environmental criterion, thus the tenderer that offers the lowest price will receive the most 
points and therefore win the contract. On the other hand, if one of the offers comprises 
100.000 shirts made of 100% recycled material to a price of 100.000 EUR, whilst the other 
tenderer can only offer shirts made of 20% recycled material, but to a price of 50.000 EUR, 
the first tenderer should be awarded the contract as it will get full points on the environmental 
criterion (100% = 10 points) and 5 points for the price (50.000 = 10 points, hence the doubled 
price equals to 5 points), whilst the second tenderer will only receive 2 points for the 
environmental criterion (20% out of 100% equals to one fifth, 10/5 = 2) and 10 points for the 
price, due to the fact that it was the lowest tender. Up to this point, it might seem like 
everything is in order.  
 
However, when looking at if the winning undertaking has been granted a benefit, it is clear 
that the measure cannot be seen as a normal commercial transaction due to the simple fact that 
it is based on environmental, or non-commercial, macro-economic factors that will result in 
the measure constituting a benefit or advantage in the meaning of Article 107 (1) TFEU.74 
This is because the MEIP does not allow other aspects than of micro-economic nature to be 
considered when assessing if a benefit or advantage is at hand. Thus, because it is the use of 
the environmental clause in the tender that is the reason to why tenderer number one is 
awarded the contract, the MEIP is failed and a benefit has been conferred upon the 
undertaking, meaning that the measure falls within the scope of Article 107 (1) TFEU 
(provided that the other three criteria are fulfilled as well). After looking at this example, it is 																																																								74	European	Commission	v	Électricité	de	France	(EDF),	C-124/10	P,	ECLI:EU:C:2012:318,	para.	78-83.	
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not hard to understand that there is an actual problem with how the MEIP is designed today, 
which will also be relevant for every single tender procedure after the entry into force of the 
new Directive where there is an obligation to take environmental considerations. This is why 
the MEIP has to be amended.  
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3. The	Dysfunctional	Principle	–	a	Closer	Analysis	of	the	MEIP	
The MEIP is claimed to be the most suitable solution to use in order to decide whether a 
benefit or advantage has been conferred upon an undertaking in the legal literature, which is 
also the reason to why it is the test used by the CJEU. However, as mentioned above, the 
principle is not suitable on all cases that may arise within the area of state aid, which will be 
further discussed below. In addition, there are several problems with the MEIP in its current 
design, due to the simple fact that it was introduced at a time when the market and its 
objectives looked different than it does today.  
3.1	The	MEIP’s	(In)applicability	on	Public	Procurement	Cases	
3.1.1	The	role	of	the	State	in	a	public	procurement	procedure	
The MEIP focuses on the cases where the State acts as an investor, which can be seen in the 
extensive case law from the Court. By the term investor, it is implied that only profit-seeking 
objectives can be regarded.75 However, in a public procurement procedure, the State is not to 
be considered to be an investor, but rather a purchaser. A purchaser does not act in the same 
way as an investor does, due to the fact that the underlying reason for the activity will never 
be the same. An investor will offer an investment to the undertaking, meaning that they will 
supply something to the undertaking. In contrast, a purchaser will instead buy, or demand, 
something from the undertaking.76 Thus, it is clear that the situations are not the same. Even 
though the main purpose of the public procurement rules is to protect competition from being 
distorted, it also has to be remembered that the different roles of the State in a public 
procurement procedures are more than one. Firstly, the State acts as an Agent, as the 
relationship between the State and its citizens can be seen as an agency relationship where the 
State have to purchase goods or services in order to satisfy the public interest, hence to pursue 
macro-economic goals .77 Secondly, the State acts as a Market-Maker in the sense that each 
tender procedure can be seen as a creation of a new market platform where competition is 
created.78 In other words, micro-economic aspects are also present when a public procurement 
procedure is being conducted. Hence, a comparison to a market investor is wrong due to the 																																																								75	As	 to	 what	 concerns	 the	 micro-economic	 aspects	 in	 relation	 to	 macro-economic	 aspects,	 please	 see	section	3.2	below.	76	Doern,	 A.	 (2004).	 The	 Interaction	 Between	 EC	 Rules	 on	 Public	 Procurement	 and	 State	 Aid.	 Public	Procurement	Law	Review.	3.97.	Page	13.	77	Sánchez	 Graells,	 A.	 (2011).	 Public	 Procurement	 and	 the	 EU	 Competition	 Rules.	 United	 Kingdom:	 Hart	Publishing.	Pages	52-55.	78	ibid.	pages	48	and	54.	
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fact that a market investor does not take upon itself the same role as the State does, therefore 
it is not an equivalent subject to be compared to.  
3.1.2	The	MEIP,	the	MECP	or	something	completely	different?	
The MEIP is designed in order to settle cases where the State, in different ways, supplies 
something and it can therefore be argued that the differences between the two situations are 
big enough in order for the MEIP to be inapplicable on cases concerning public procurement 
procedures. This can be supported by the mere fact that the Court has presented another 
principle in cases where the State acts as a creditor, the market economy creditor principle 
(henceforth referred to as MECP). Even though the differences are minor between a case 
where the State is investing money in an undertaking and a case where the undertaking is 
supported by the State in form of a favourable loan in various ways, the Court has ruled that 
the differences are still big enough in order for two different assessments to be used. This can 
be illustrated with a comparison of the case Selecto79, where the State aided an undertaking in 
difficulty through an investment, and the case HAMSA80, where the aid was constituted by a 
debt cancellation, and the Court applied the MEIP in the Selecto case, whilst the MECP was 
applied in the latter.81 Thus, a major difference in circumstances is not needed for the Court to 
apply a different test that considers different aspects of the measure. On the contrary, it is true 
that the Court always looks at the ‘normal market conditions’ of the specific type of measure; 
it is always the normal market conditions that will be compared, however the subject to which 
the State is compared to varies depending on if the State acts as an investor or as a creditor.  
 
In relation to the abovementioned, it is submitted that a different test is needed when the 
situation concerns a purchase through a public procurement procedure due to the fact that the 
cases regarding purchases differ more than the cases where the MEIP is applied and cases 
where the MECP is applied. It has been submitted in the literature that there already is a third 
version of the test, namely the private market purchaser test (henceforth referred to as the 
PMPT). However, the Union Courts have ruled in a few cases concerning public procurement 
procedures, where it is debatable whether it was the PMPT or actually the MEIP that was 
																																																								79	Seleco,	Joined	cases	C-328/99	and	C-399/00,	ECLI:EU:C:2003:252.	80	HAMSA,	T-152/99,	ECLI:EU:T:2002:188.	81	Doern,	 A.	 (2004).	 The	 Interaction	 Between	 EC	 Rules	 on	 Public	 Procurement	 and	 State	 Aid.	 Public	Procurement	 Law	Review.	 3.97.	Page	13;	Hancher,	 L.,	 Ottervanger,	 T.,	 and	 Jan	 Slot,	 P.	 (2006).	 	EC	State	
Aids.	(Third	Edition).	London:	Sweet	&	Maxwell.	Page	79.	
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applied. For example, in the case BAI v Commission,82 it can be argued that the GC actually 
applied the same assessment as in cases concerning measures conducted by the state in the 
form of an investor. In other words, in the BAI case, the GC did not use a different test; it was 
actually the same principle, the MEIP, which was applied. The circumstances of the case were 
the following: the Spanish authorities concluded a contract with an undertaking regarding a 
purchase of a large number of travel vouchers, which were supposed to be given to, among 
others, low-income groups. Hence, there was a social aim of the purchase. The Commission 
found the contract to constitute state aid in accordance with Article 107 (1) TFEU as the 
Spanish authorities paid a higher price in comparison to what other, private, purchasers did. 
The parties then concluded a new contract, where the same price was paid but where the 
amount of travel vouchers almost doubled. However, the GC found that the purchase was not 
to be seen as a normal transaction, and the measure hence failed the MEIP.83  The GC found 
that state aid was at hand in the scope of Article 107 (1) TFEU, as the undertaking was given 
a benefit in the form of that more travel vouchers were sold (thus, more profit) than it would 
have been if a normal market investor had purchased the goods; the purchase was not 
motivated from a commercial point of view.  
 
Nevertheless, no emphasis was added to the fact that the situation differed from cases where 
the MEIP normally is applied, namely where the State is acting as an investor. When looking 
at the GC’s reasoning, it is clear that the assessment was actually done from the perspective 
that the Spanish state acted as an investor. The GC began by looking at the price of the 
purchase, where it was stated that it was higher than the published commercial price, which 
resulted in higher profit for the undertaking and did therefore not constitute a normal 
commercial transaction. The GC continued by examining the actual need of the purchase, 
however the ‘actual need’ assessment that was discussed in the judgment served as an 
exemption to when the MEIP has to be applied; the GC ruled that if a State has no actual need 
for a procured good or service, there is a presumption that a market investor would not have 
executed the purchase in the first place, and therefore there is no need to examine whether the 
purchase itself was made at normal market conditions.84 Hence, the specific assessment done 
in the case only comprised the price of the purchase, which is how the test is carried out in 																																																								82	BAI	v	Commission,	T-14/96,	ECLI:EU:T:1999:12.	83	ibid,	para.	80.	84	Arrowsmith,	 S.	 and	 Kunzlik,	 P.	 (2009).	 Social	 and	 Environmental	 Policies	 in	 EC	 Procurement	 Law.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	Page	258.	
	 	 27	
cases concerning investments by the State as well, however no further aspects in relation to 
the fact that the case concerned a public procurement procedure was added. Hence, the GC 
used the MEIP, and not the PMPT. Even though the GC had the chance to introduce a test that 
could have been the beginning of the development of a test that could be applied on cases 
where the State acts as a purchaser, it did not.  
 
In addition, the judgment did not include a discussion regarding the use of secondary criteria 
in a tender, which could have provided guidance for how to handle environmental criteria in a 
public tender due to the fact that the social aims was simply used as an argument to prove if 
there was an actual need of the travel vouchers. It was only stated that social or cultural aims 
play no part in the assessment of whether the measure constitutes state aid or not.85 This is 
important to point out, due to the fact that an amendment of the MEIP, or rather an 
introduction to a new principle, should not contradict old case law since that would create an 
uncertain jurisprudence and thereby contradict one of the major aims of introducing an 
alternative to the MEIP.86 Thus, an amendment of the MEIP in the form of including 
secondary criteria such as environmental protection will therefore not contradict earlier case 
law settled by the Court and will therefore not cause any problems as mentioned above.  
3.1.3	Conclusion	
As a result from the abovementioned, it is argued that the MEIP is not suitable to apply in 
cases where the State acts as a purchaser, because of the simple fact that the MEIP is not 
designed to do so. The differences between the cases concerning investors versus the cases 
that concerns purchaser are too many; the activities itself (the investments/purchases) as well 
as the objectives of the activities (supply/demand) differ to the extent that the MEIP cannot 
cover both cases, but instead a development of the MEIP is needed.  
3.2	Micro-Economic	vs.	Macro-Economic	Objectives	
The distinction between what is to be considered as a pure business, micro-economic,87 
objective and what is to be seen as a public, macro-economic, objective may seem quite easy 																																																								85	BAI	v	Commission,	T-14/96,	ECLI:EU:T:1999:12,	para.	81.	86	Due	to	the	fact	that	it	would	contradict	the	aim	of	removing	or	amending	the	MEIP,	which	is	to	reduce	the	difficulties	that	exists	today.	87	The	CJEU	uses	terms	such	as	‘commercial’	or	‘normal	market	conditions’	when	referring	to	what	factors	that	should	be	 included	 in	 the	MEIP,	yet	 the	 term	 ‘micro-economic	aspect’	will	be	used	here	 in	order	 to	demonstrate	and	emphasise	the	differences	to	macro-economic	aspects.	However	the	meaning	of	the	term	will	be	the	same	as	the	CJEU	uses	it.	
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at first sight, however there are many considerations which fall within the grey zone, out of 
which environmental protection is one. Micro-economic objectives are those that aim at 
maximize profit for the business, including for instance efficiency and productivity, due to the 
simple reason that generation of profit is crucial for the maintenance of the business.88 
Microeconomics looks at the market mechanisms that affects the decisions of the business, or 
the consumer, thus a narrow perspective is used when looking at the market. On the other 
hand, macro-economic objectives aim at providing services that are needed in the community, 
or in other words the welfare of the citizens and therefore all factors that affect the economy 
as a whole are focused upon.89 As mentioned earlier, one has to separate the measures that are 
conducted by the State when it acts as an investor and when it acts as a public authority, and 
obviously it is when the State acts as a public authority it can, and is perfectly allowed to, 
pursue its macro-economic objectives and policies,90 whilst it is the micro-economic aspect of 
maximizing profit when it acts as an investor. When the State uses its powers as a public 
authority to pursue its macro-economic goals when acting as an investor, it gets complicated.  
3.2.1	Micro-economic	aspects		
There is not a clear-cut of what aspects that are micro-economical and macro-economical, and 
even though it is important to be able to separate micro- and macro-economic aspects, there 
will of course be interaction between the two as these are dependent on each other; if the 
employment rate decreases drastically, this will have an effect on the business in the form of 
the supply of workers that will then have an effect on the price etc. The CJEU has held that 
the assessment done under the MEIP looks at whether the investment done by the State is 
generating any return91, or in other words profit.92 It has also been settled that it does not have 
to be a short-term aim of profit that is pursued, but it might as well be profitability in the long-
term.93 Differently put, losses in the short-term are actually allowed as long as it generates 
profit in the long run. In addition, it is not enough for the State to claim that it has carried out 																																																								88	See	 for	 instance	 the	 reasoning	 by	 the	 GC	 in	 the	 cases	Linde,	 T-98/00,	 ECLI:EU:T:2002:248,	 para.	 49;	
Westdeutsche	Landesbank	v	Commission,	 Joined	cases	T-228/99	and	T-233/99,	ECLI:EU:T:2003:57	 	para.	245.	89	Investopedia.	Search	word:	“Macroeconomics”.	Accessed	19	October	2015.		<http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/macroeconomics.asp>.	90	For	instance	environmental	protection,	combatting	unemployment	or	similar	objectives.	91 	SFEI,	 C-39/94,	 ECLI:EU:C:1996:285,	 para.	 57-62;	 French	 Republic	 v	 Commission	 of	 the	 European	
Communities,	 C-482/99,	 ECLI:EU:C:2002:294,	 para.	 69-70;	 Italy	 v	 Commission,	 C-303/88,	ECLI:EU:C:1991:136,	para.	20-22.	92	West	LB,	Joined	cases	T-228/99	and	T-233/99,	ECLI:EU:T:2003:57,	para.	255.	93	Italian	Republic	v	Commission,	C-305/89,	ECLI:EU:C:1991:142,	para.	20.	
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a measure with the aim to generate profit but that the final result did not turn out to be as 
expected. Instead, objective and verifiable proof is needed in order for the measure to not 
constitute a benefit under the MEIP assessment. This has been emphasised by the 
Commission in the case France Télécom: 
 
“Affirming one's intention to behave like a prudent investor is not enough when it comes to 
complying with the rules on state aid, and in particular with the prudent private investor 
principle. Otherwise, all Member States would have to do in order to comply with the rules is 
maintain that they have complied with them, and the Commission's monitoring activity would 
be entirely superfluous. Moreover, it is not for the Member States to judge whether the 
prudent investor test has been met, but for the Commission under the watchful eye of the 
Community courts”.94 
 
However, the fact that the assessment circles around profit and compares the State’s action to 
an ideal, prudent investor’s activities makes the MEIP static. As the market changes, the 
objectives of the business will also change due to the fact that the business has to satisfy the 
market in order to generate profit, and it is because of that simple reason that the MEIP has 
caused problems over the years. The market has developed into something different than what 
it was in the 1980’s, when the MEIP was first established. In theory, the MEIP is the most 
suitable test to evaluate if a benefit or advantage is at hand, as it will have a pure commercial, 
micro-economic perspective when analysing the measure at hand. However, this is not how it 
works in reality. Due to the fact that private investors have to change their commercial 
considerations to match what the market demands in order to gain profit, there will not be one 
single definition as to what those considerations actually are. In addition, as the MEIP looks 
at how an “ideal investor” would have operated in theory95 and not at the development of the 
real market, the institutions of the EU have not developed the MEIP to reflect the current 
market. Today, this has resulted in an MEIP that is applied in cases concerning the “real 
market”, but which will not pass the MEIP assessment. In other words, the measure carried 
out by the State does actually in some cases corresponds to a measure that a market investor 
would have considered today, but it will fail the MEIP test as this has not been developed in 																																																								94	2006/621/EC:	 Commission	 Decision	 of	 2	 August	 2004	 on	 the	 State	 Aid	 implemented	 by	 France	 for	France	 Télécom,	 OJ	 L	 257,	 20.9.2006,	 pp.	 11-67,	 para.	 210.	 In	 the	 case,	 the	 Commission	 uses	 the	 term	“prudent	private	investor	test”	and	“prudent	investor	test”,	however	it	has	the	same	meaning	as	the	MEIP.		95 	West	 LB,	 Joined	 cases	 T-228/99	 and	 T-233/99,	 ECLI:EU:T:2003:57,	 para.	 255;	 Linde,	 T-98/00,	ECLI:EU:T:2002:248,	para.	149;	France	v	Commission,	C-482/99,	ECLI:EU:C:2002:294,	para.	72-77.	
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the same pace as the market has done. This can be seen in the case law from the CJEU, for 
instance in the abovementioned case BAI96 as well as in the case Comitato.97 When the MEIP 
was applied in those cases, the Court ruled that only commercial considerations should be 
regarded, but as Arrowsmith argues, private investors do sometimes take for instance 
environmental or social aspects into consideration when operating on the market.98 This 
proves that the MEIP does not actually correspond to the actions of a prudent investor, but 
instead it selects what aspects that should be included in the assessment, which might be one 
of the reasons why the MEIP is considered to be problematic and inadequate.  
 
Hence, the economic analysis done by the Court in the assessment of whether the State has 
acted in the same way as a market economy investor would have done covers a broad 
spectrum of factors which can be divided into different categories, but it will always come 
down to one thing; profit.99 Profit is the primary, superior micro-economic objective, whilst 
there are other secondary, or depending, sub-objectives of micro-economic aspects. These are 
objectives that the market investor will only pursue as long as it generates profit; they are 
dependent on what is demanded by the market at that time, because when the market investor 
supplies what is demanded, profit will be generated. This has been affirmed by the GC, which 
has stated that all measures taken should be motivated primarily by commercial 
considerations.100 To illustrate an example, suppose that there is an economic operator whom 
supplies shoes. The main objective of the business will be to generate profit in order to 
maintain the business. Thus, if the market demands pink shoes, the economic operator will 
supply pink shoes in order to generate profit. The investment in pink shoes can therefore be 
seen as a secondary, depending objective because the investment in itself is not the primary 
objective. Instead, it is done in order to acquire profit. The economic operator will also make 
sure that his or her business is as efficient and productive as possible, in order to produce as 
many shoes as possible to the lowest price due to the fact that it will generate the highest 
																																																								96	BAI	v	Commission,	T-14/96,	ECLI:EU:T:1999:12,	para.	81.	See	section	3.1.2	for	further	information.		97	Comitato	 (“Venezia	 vuole	 vivere”)	 v	 Commission,	 Joined	 Cases	 C‑71/09	P,	 C‑73/09	P	 and	 C‑76/09	P,	ECLI:EU:C:2011:368,	para.	90-102.	98	See	 Arrowsmith,	 S.	 and	 Kunzlik,	 P.	 (2009).	 Social	 and	Environmental	 Policies	 in	EC	Procurement	 Law.	Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press.	 Pages	 15-16,	 260	 and	 436.	 This	 does	 however	 not	mean	 that	environmental	protection	 falls	under	the	definition	of	a	micro-economic	aspect,	which	will	be	explained	further	under	section	3.3.	99 	West	 LB,	 Joined	 cases	 T-228/99	 and	 T-233/99,	 ECLI:EU:T:2003:57,	 para.	 255;	 Linde,	 T-98/00,	ECLI:EU:T:2002:248,	para.	49.	100	ibid.	Linde,	para.	49.	
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profit by doing so. Thus, efficiency and productivity may also be seen as a depending micro-
economic objective because it is done in order to generate profit. As to what regards 
environmental protection, this will be discussed further under section 3.3.  
 
As a consequence of the foregoing, it can be stated that the MEIP, in spite of it being 
theoretically the best assessment to use when determining if a measure constitutes a benefit or 
advantage, has caused the legal situation to be complicated. The business objectives will 
always depend on what the market demands and therefore the assessment done with the MEIP 
will also change over time, but since the Court has not amended the MEIP to correlate with 
the market, we have now reached a point in time when this has become problematic. Thus, the 
MEIP includes petrified business considerations that cannot be used in a way that will provide 
a fair answer to what a benefit or advantage in the sense of Article 107 (1) TFEU actually is.  
3.2.2	Macro-economic	aspects		
In contrast to micro-economic aspects, macro-economic aspects are easier to identify. Macro-
economic objectives are of non-economic nature101 and looks at trends and movements of the 
economy as a whole, and what can be problematic with this category is to actually know what 
those trends and movements are. However, as has been described in section 2.3, there is no 
doubt that the environment is one of the things that can be found at the top of the agendas not 
only in the different Member States, but also for the EU as a whole, and thereby it can be 
concluded that environmental protection is definitely one of the trends that is included in 
macro-economic aspects. This has also been confirmed in case law from the CJEU. For 
example, in the case SEPG it was stated that the exercise of powers relating to the protection 
of the environment are typically those of a public authority, which is thereby not of an 
economic nature and justifies the application of the competition rules in the Treaties (more 
specifically Article 102 TFEU).102 Thus, environmental protection is typically classified as a 
macro-economic objective.  
3.3	Can	Environmental	Protection	be	seen	as	a	Micro-Economic	Objective?	
The awareness of climate change has increased among the people in the world during the last 
decade, and the demand for environmentally friendly products and services has never been 																																																								101	Arrowsmith,	 S.	 and	 Kunzlik,	 P.	 (2009).	 Social	 and	 Environmental	 Policies	 in	 EC	 Procurement	 Law.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	Page	257f.	102	See	Diego	Calì	&	Figli	Srl	v	Servizi	ecologici	porto	di	Genova	SpA	(SEPG),	C-343/95,	ECLI:EU:C:1997:160,	para.	23;	Fluggesellschaft	v	Eurocontrol,	C-364/92,	ECLI:EU:C:1994:7,	para.	30.	
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bigger than what it is today. Hence, some of the world’s leading companies, such as Toyota, 
Unilever and GE, are working towards satisfying the consumers’ needs and are becoming 
more environmentally friendly in various ways.103 For instance, the Corporate Sustainability 
movement has grown tremendously only within a few years.104 Thus, it can be contended that 
it is not even questionable anymore whether companies do take environmental aspects into 
considerations when performing its activities or not, because we can see this movement 
towards Corporate Sustainability includes a great number of actors on the market.  
 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the underlying objectives and reasons why the 
environmental considerations are taken are not the same when comparing a public authority 
and a private company. The State has an obligation and a responsibility towards its citizens as 
a pubic authority to ensure, for example, environmental protection and working towards a 
better future for the next generations. In other words, the State considers environmental 
aspects because of the climate change and the need to improve the environment in itself, even 
in cases where the costs are substantial. Hence, a macro-economic (and genuine 
environmentally friendly) approach is used by the State. On the contrary, private companies 
will adopt the environmental objectives because the market demands environmentally friendly 
products. By ‘caring’ about the environment in the production of the good or service that the 
company supplies, it will generate goodwill or be more attractive on the market and people 
will therefore buy that specific product or service. Thus, the reason as to why companies take 
environmental aspects when carrying out their activities is mainly because that will generate 
profit. Private operators on the market will not do anything unless it, either in the short- or the 
long-term, will increase the profitability of the company. The use of environmental aspects is 
a ‘trend’ that the companies adopt in order to gain profit. Even though the market is asking for 
environmentally friendly products, it is still an unquestionable fact that being environmentally 
friendly increases the costs for the companies and thereby generates less profit.105 The 
companies would not have worked towards being environmental friendly unless the market 																																																								103	Benn,	S.,	Dunphy,	D.	and	Griffiths,	A.	(2014).	Organizational	change	for	corporate	Sustainability.	(Third	Edition).	New	York:	Routledge.	Page	4.	104	ibid.;	Arrowsmith,	S.	and	Kunzlik,	P.	(2009).	Social	and	Environmental	Policies	in	EC	Procurement	Law.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	Page	436.	105	This	will	also	result	in	the	companies	trying	to	incorporate	these	extra	costs	in	the	price	of	the	good	or	service	that	they	are	offering,	and	it	can	therefore	be	argued	that	it	 is	actually	the	consumers	whom	are	paying	for	the	environment.	However,	a	higher	price	will	result	in	less	sale	for	the	company,	thus	also	less	profit.	 See	 Vedder,	 H.	 (2003).	 Competition	 Law	 and	 Environmental	 Protection	 in	 Europe;	 Towards	
Sustainability?	Groningen:	Europa	Law	Publishing.	Page	45.	
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encouraged them to do so. In addition, companies cannot adopt environmental objectives 
where the costs are substantial and exceed future profit, as this would result in the company 
being removed from the market. As a result of the foregoing and in relation to what has been 
argued in section 3.2, it can be concluded that environmental aspects cannot be regarded as a 
pure business objective in the sense of the micro-economic approach that is used in the MEIP 
today. From a pure micro-economic perspective, a private economic operator cannot pursue 
environmental aspects if the costs for the measures are too substantial in relation to the profit 
it will generate in the near future, which differs from a public authority that can operate on a 
loss-basis in order to improve the environment without having its entire economic situation 
jeopardised.   
 
Arrowsmith, as many others, proposes that environmental aspects are actually taken into 
consideration by private market participants as well, due to the fact that the market is 
demanding environmentally friendly products, therefore the private investors will supply 
environmentally friendly products. She supports her argument with Adam Smith’s theory 
about the Invisible Hand, stating that the pursuit of macro-economic objectives such as 
environmental protection is normal market behaviour.106 However, it can still be argued that 
environmental protection is a macro-economic aspect; private investors will only supply the 
environmental friendly goods because the market demands it, hence in order to maximize 
profit. Once again, the market investors would not carry out the measure or investment if the 
market did not demand it. Even if Arrowsmith wants to reach the same conclusion, that is to 
say that environmental protection should be considered in public procurement procedures as 
well as be included in the MEIP, it is important to separate the two arguments due to the fact 
that it is in my view unsustainable to allow the MEIP to take in different values just because 
the market’s demand changes. The market will always change, hence allowing different 
secondary, macro-economic criteria depending on what the market asks for today may have 
severe legal consequences that will make the use of different measures even harder for the 
Member States than what it already is today. And how do we decide which of all the different 
demands that the market asks for that should be taken into account in the application of the 
MEIP, and which we should not consider? Thus, we need to find another way to be able to 
use environmental clauses in a public procurement without it constituting state aid.   
																																																								106	Arrowsmith,	 S.	 and	 Kunzlik,	 P.	 (2009).	 Social	 and	 Environmental	 Policies	 in	 EC	 Procurement	 Law.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	Pages	15-16,	260	and	436.	
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3.4	Conclusion	
In conclusion, it can be understood that there are elements of the State acting both as an 
investor and as a public authority when a public tender is conducted. The fact that a public 
procurement procedure aims at ensuring fair competition and that the State has to select the 
tenderer that offers the most economically advantageous tender proves that components of 
micro-economic nature is at hand. In addition, it can be contended that a purchase made 
through public procurement is done in order for the State to achieve objectives of public 
policy, hence to satisfy public interests and pursue macro-economic objectives. It is based on 
this simple fact that the MEIP is not a suitable test to examine if state aid is at hand. It cannot 
be required by the State to only pursue micro-economic goals in the form of profitability 
when a purchase is done, as the purchase itself aims to accomplish both micro- and macro-
economic goals. The State cannot use environmental award criteria in a public tender as long 
as the MEIP is designed in the way it is today, based on the fact that only commercial 
considerations are to be taken into account when carrying out the assessment of whether an 
economic advantage is conferred on the undertaking or not.107 According to the Court, if a 
private purchaser was to organise a tender, all “social, regional-policy and sectorial 
considerations” should have been left aside,108 as such factors are not motivated primarily by 
commercial considerations. In other words, the contract awarded in a public procurement 
procedure due to compliance with environmental requirements would not have been awarded 
on a private market because it does not generate the highest profit, thus making the use of 
green clauses in a public tender procedure impossible for the Member States.  
 
In addition, micro-economic objectives can consist of various factors, however they are all 
focusing on generating profit. On the other hand, macro-economic aspects concern factors 
that affect the economy and welfare as a whole. A prudent, private investor cannot pursue 
macro-economic objectives, as macro-economic objectives by definition are of non-economic 
nature. Hence, it can be stated that the use of secondary, macro-economic policies in a public 
procurement procedure creates a presumption that state aid is at hand due to the fact that the 
current version of the MEIP will be failed when policies of non-economic nature are being 
used in a public procurement procedure. Also, if environmental aspects were to be included in 
the current MEIP (that is to say without actually amending it, but only to start including 
																																																								107	Linde,	T-98/00,	ECLI:EU:T:2002:248,	para.	49.	108	Belgium	v	Commission,	Case	40/85,	ECLI:EU:C:1986:305,	para.	14.	
	 	 35	
environmental policies in the assessment that is used today), the problems that have already 
been caused by the principle would increase even more due to the fact that the trends of the 
market, such as environmental protection still is considered to be today, will change over time 
and including such trends would make the assessment under the MEIP inconsistent and would 
only cause legal uncertainty.  
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4. The	 Shift	 of	 the	 Main	 Objective	 of	 EU	 –	 an	 Analysis	 of	 the	Conflict	Between	Competition	and	Environmental	Protection		
As described above, the core of the problem with the MEIP is that it is now shaped in a way 
that it cannot fully pursue environmental goals in addition to purely economical goals. The 
MEIP is designed in a way that it shall secure the free competition on the market, thus if 
competition should precede environmental protection the principle shall remain the same as 
that objective can be pursued with the MEIP as it looks today. Consequently, it all comes 
down to the question of how the two objectives can interact; which, if any, objective precedes 
the other? This question is important to answer as it has a crucial impact on, firstly, if the 
MEIP should change at all, and secondly if it should be amended, how the new principle 
should be shaped instead. In order to carry out an analysis in this respect, the following 
sections will look at how the conflict of the two objectives is handled on different levels, 
starting with the areas of state aid and public procurement, then looking at the bigger picture 
of competition in general, and last but not least how the clash between the objectives is 
managed on Treaty level.  
4.1	Environment	contra	Competition	–	an	Insolvable	Problem?	
4.1.1	State	aid	and	public	procurement	
The areas of state aid and public procurement are pervaded by the principle of an internal 
market and free competition, which is why these two legal areas may be some of the hardest 
to implement environmental policies to. On the other hand, there have been several attempts 
to do so, one of them being the new Directives and the introduction to green procurement, 
which have forced the EU to face the question of in what way and to what extent 
environmental aspects can be heeded within the two areas.  
 
To begin with, the GC proved in one of its recent cases, Castelnou Energía, SL v European 
Commission,109 that free competition and thus the maintenance of the internal market is still 
the main objective for the state aid rules. The case concerned state aid from the Spanish 
authority to undertakings in the form of subsidies; the Spanish legislator had adopted a decree 
that stated that 10 power plants had to use indigenous coal (that is to say coal of Spanish 
origin), which was more expensive than other fuels. Because of that, another decree was 
adopted, stating that the owners of the power plants were to receive compensation for the 																																																								109	Castelnou	Energía,	SL	v	European	Commission,	T-57/11,	ECLI:EU:T:2014:1021.	
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additional production costs, due to the fact that the activity of the undertakings was classified 
as an SGEI. This was notified to the Commission, which held that the fourth Altmark 
criterion110 was not fulfilled and therefore the measure constituted state aid. Nonetheless, 
since the measure was an SGEI, the Commission found that it was compatible with the 
internal market in accordance with Article 106 (2) TFEU.111 In the ruling, the GC stated that: 
 
“If aid for the protection of the environment can be declared compatible with the internal 
market under Article 107(3)(b) or (c) TFEU, aid which has harmful effects on the 
environment does not, by that fact alone, adversely affect the establishment of the internal 
market. Although it must be integrated into the definition and implementation of EU policies, 
particularly those which have the aim of establishing the internal market […], protection of 
the environment does not constitute, per se, one of the components of that internal market, 
defined as an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured” (emphasis added).112 
 
The same view characterises other judgments from the Court, where it for instance has been 
ruled that even though environmental protection constitutes one of the essential objectives of 
the EU, the need to take that objective into account does not justify the exclusion of selective 
measures from the scope of Article 107 (1) TFEU.113 Accordingly, it is still the view of the 
EU institutions that competition precedes environmental protection in the area of state aid. As 
to what concerns public procurement, the internal market, transparency and competition is 
constantly referred and argued to be the most important objectives to be achieved in the case 
law.114  
 
																																																								110	A	method	used	by	the	Court	to	determine	the	level	of	compensation	in	order	to	discharge	public	service	obligations	 (SGEI’s)	 from	 being	 state	 aid,	 established	 by	 the	 Court	 in	 the	 case	 Altmark,	 C-280/00,	ECLI:EU:2003:415,	para.	89-93.	111	Article	106	(2)	TFEU	is	an	’exemption’	from	a	measure	constituting	state	aid,	by	deeming	it	compatible	with	the	internal	market.		112	Castelnou	Energía,	SL	v	European	Commission,	T-57/11,	ECLI:EU:T:2014:1021,	para.	189.	113	European	 Commission	 v	 Kingdom	 of	 Netherlands,	 C-278/08,	 ECLI:EU:C:2011:551,	 para.	 75;	 British	
Aggregates	 v	 Commission,	 C-487/06	 P,	 ECLI:EU:C:2008:757,	 para.	 92;	 Spain	 v	 Commission,	 C-409/00,	ECLI:EU:C:2003:92,	para.	46-54.	114	For	example,	see	cases	Commission	v	CAS	Succhi	di	Frutta,	C‑496/99	P,	ECLI:EU:C:2004236,	para.	111;	
Lombardini	 and	 Mantovan,	 Joined	 Cases	 C‑285/99	 and	 C‑286/99,	 ECLI:EU:C:2001:640,	 para.	 38	 and;	
Commission	v	Cyprus,	C‑251/09,	ECLI:EU:C:2011:84,	para.	38.	
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On the contrary, the institutions of the EU have shown a tendency towards giving 
environmental protection, perhaps not the same, but at least increased dignity in relation to 
competition within both the area of state aid and public procurement. This can be 
demonstrated by for instance the Concordia case.115 The ECJ allowed the Finnish public 
authority to use environmental standards as an award criterion in a public procurement 
procedure regarding buses. The Court stated that a contracting authority may use 
environmental criteria as award criteria in a public tender in order to decide which tender that 
is the economically most advantageous one, “provided that they are linked to the subject-
matter of the contract, do not confer an unrestricted freedom of choice on the authority, are 
expressly mentioned in the contract documents or the tender notice, and comply with all the 
fundamental principles of Union law, in particular the principle of non-discrimination”.116 
Member States can only use award criteria in order to determine which offer that constitutes 
the ‘most economically advantageous tender’ in accordance with Article 67 (1) in the 
Directive, and award criteria do not necessarily have to be of purely economic nature.117 This 
view was later confirmed by the Court in the case Wienstroem, where this approach was taken 
one step further by deeming that a weighting of 45% for an environmental award criterion 
was not incompatible with the public procurement rules on finding the most economically 
advantageous tender.118 The fact that the Court recognised the use of environmental clauses as 
award criteria in the public procurement procedure opened up for the possibility of 
environmental protection to be a part of the assessment regarding the concept of most 
economically advantageous tender. In other words, the Court adopted an approach towards 
environmental aspects being regarded as economic, hence a component of the internal market. 
However, it will probably take a long time before environmental protection is completely 
included in what can be seen as a criterion of purely economic nature. 
 
Thus, it can be contended that within the state aid and public procurement regimes, the 
environmental protection is on the move towards becoming a criterion of purely economic 
nature that is to be regarded in the assessment of a measure’s compatibility with the internal 
market. However, the Court has not yet provided completely clear guidelines on how to 
																																																								115	Concordia,	C-513/99,	ECLI:EU:C:2002:495.	116	ibid.	para.	69.	117	ibid.	para.	55.	118	Wienstroem,	C-448/01,	ECLI:EU:C:2003:651,	para.	42.	
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handle environmental protection in relation to competition in the respect of state aid and 
public procurement.  
4.1.2	Competition	law		
In other areas of EU competition law, it can be seen that the Court has started to reconsider its 
established case law of how to handle environmental aspects’ interaction with competition 
law. For instance, the CJEU has produced coherent case law stating that a Member State 
could not justify restraining measures that were only applied on imported products without 
distinction with imperative requirements.119 The concept of imperative requirements was first 
ruled upon in the case Cassis de Dijon, where the ECJ stated that trade barriers must be 
accepted in so far as it is necessary to satisfy imperative requirements, if they are applied in a 
non-discriminatory way, in other words measures that are indistinctly applicable.120 The list of 
what imperative requirements are provided by in Cassis de Dijon is open-ended, and the 
Court has over the years developed the doctrine of imperative requirements to comprehend 
several measures, where environmental protection is one of them.121 However, as stated 
above, imperative requirements will only justify a measure that is indistinctly applied. That 
means that the Court has until recently focused on the removal of trade barriers in different 
forms instead of giving other objectives, such as environmental protection, precedence. This 
might be the case due to the fact that it is easier to identify trade barriers than to interfere with 
the environmental politics.  
 
However, as AG Jacobs has pointed out in its opinion in the case PreussenElektra, the Court 
has actually justified, even though it is debatable, trade-restraining measures with just 
imperative requirements in cases where the measure was applied with discretion. AG Jacobs 
then proposed a “more flexible approach in respect of the imperative requirement of 
environmental protection”,122 where he stated that together with the introduction to the new 
Treaties, the concern for the environmental aspects was heightened even though the relevant 																																																								119	See	 for	 instance	 Commission	 v	 Ireland,	 Case	 113/80,	 ECLI:EU:C:1981:139,	 para.	 11;	 AG	 Jacobs	 in	
PreussenElectra,	C-379/98,	ECLI:EU:C:2000:585	para.	220;	Aragonesa	de	Publicidad	Exterior,	Joined	cases	C-1/90	 and	 C-176/90,	 ECLI:EU:C:1991:327,	 para.	13;	 and	 Reinhard	 Gebhard,	 C-55/94,	ECLI:EU:C:1995:411,	para.	37.		120	Cassis	de	Dijon,	Case	120/78,	ECLI:EU:C:1979:42,	para.	8.	The	term	”imperative	requirements”	refers	to	the	 same	 meaning	 as	 the	 Court’s	 ”mandatory	 requirement”	 used	 in	 Cassis	 de	 Dijon.	 For	 further	information,	see	Bernard,	C.	(2013).	The	Substantial	Law	of	the	EU	–	The	Four	Freedoms.	(Fourth	Edition).	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	Page	171.	121	ibid,	Bernard,	C.	Page	172.	122	AG	Jacobs	in	PreussenElectra,	C-379/98,	ECLI:EU:C:2000:585	para.	230.	
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Article for the case was not amended. By that, AG Jacob means that the justification for 
giving the environment less protection than what has been given to trade or similar interests 
recognised decades ago would be hard as the harm to the environment is a great threat to 
humanity.123 In addition, the mere fact that the Court has ruled in several cases that 
environmental protection is an imperative requirement implies that environmental protection 
is given priority even in cases that concerns pure competition matters. From the 
abovementioned, it is understood that the CJEU takes environmental protection into account 
when looking at a measure’s compatibility with the internal market, meaning that 
environmental protection is being strengthened. However, it is still clear that competition is 
the dominating objective within competition law, obviously.  
4.1.3	Treaty	principles	
In order to assess how the conflict between environmental protection and competition is 
handled at Treaty level, it first has to be examined what impact the obligations deriving from 
the Treaties have on the Member States. This is due to the fact that it is the Member States 
that carries out the tender procedures, and thus it is the Member States that have to comply 
with the environmental obligation.  
4.1.3.1	 What	 impact	 does	 the	 objectives	 regarding	 environmental	 protection	 in	 the	
Treaties	have	on	the	Member	States?		
There is no easy answer to the question of what the exact aims of the EU are, and it might be 
even harder to answer the question of what legal impact the fundamental goals in Article 3 
TEU as well as Articles 7-17 TFEU has on the Member States. In the case Zaera, the Court 
ruled that the fundamental aims and objectives of the Union cannot impose legal obligations 
on Member States when looked upon in isolation.124  
 
Regarding Article 3 TEU, it can be understood from the wording of the Article that it is 
addressed to the EU and not to the Member States, as it states “the Union’s aim” and “the 
Union shall”, and does not mention the Member States at all. When looking at the objectives 
listed in the TFEU, it cannot be given a general answer to the question of whom the Articles 
are addressing, but instead each Article has to be read on its own. As to what concerns Article 
11 TFEU, if a pure textual interpretation is applied, it is also addressed to the EU and not to 																																																								123	ibid,	para.	230-232.	124	Zaera,	Case	126/86,	ECLI:EU:C:1987:395,	para.	10-11;	Firma	Sloman	Neptun	Schiffahrts,	Joined	cases	C-72/91	and	C-73/91,	ECLI:EU:C:1993:97,	para.	25-28.	
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the Member States. Thus, when analysing the specific objective on its own, an obligation to 
integrate the fundamental aims and objectives found in Article 3 (3) TEU and Article 11 
TFEU lies only on the EU itself.  
 
On the other hand, it is important to remember that the EU has established the general 
principle of loyalty and sincere cooperation, which can be found in Article 4 (3) TEU (which 
will henceforth be referred to as the principle of loyalty). The principle aims at ensuring that 
the Member States fulfil the obligations that derive from the Treaties.125 This can be 
understood from the mere fact that the Article entails that the Union and the Member States 
shall assist each other when carrying out the tasks that flow from the Treaties. In other words, 
failure from one of the parties does not justify a failure from the other party. The Court has 
ruled upon the principle in Article 4 (3) TEU several times, and from the case law it can be 
understood that the obligation for the Member States to remain loyal and cooperate with the 
EU is extensive.126 Hence, it has a large scope of application and as the Treaties are the core 
legislation of the EU, it would be peculiar if the principle of loyalty did not cover the 
fundamental objectives stated there as well.  
 
Hence, as the relevant Articles should be interpreted in the light of the principle of loyalty, it 
can be concluded that the Member States do have a responsibility and a duty to pursue the 
same aims as the Union set forth in the Treaties. Consequently, the Member States do have an 
obligation to fulfil the environmental policy in Article 3 (3) TEU and Article 11 TFEU to the 
same extent as the Union does.   
4.1.3.2	How	 is	 the	 conflict	between	 competition	and	environmental	protection	managed	
on	Treaty	level?	
It is often, and probably rightly, argued that the main objective as well as one of the main 
reasons for founding the EU was to create an internal market and promote free trade.127 It has 																																																								125	Kjellgren,	 A.	 and	 Bernitz,	 U.	 (2010).	 Europarättens	 grunder.	 (Fourth	 Edition).	 Stockholm:	 Norstedts	Juridik.	Page	110f.	126	For	example,	 the	principle	has	been	applied	 in	cases	concerning	various	 legal	areas.	See	 for	 instance	
Grand	Duchy	of	Luxembourg	v	European	Parliament,	Case	230/81,	ECLI:EU:C:1983:32,	para.	37	concerning	the	competence	of	 the	European	Parliament;	Pupino,	C-105/03,	ECLI:EU:C:2005:386,	para.	42	regarding	cooperation	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 Member	 States	 in	 criminal	 matters,	 which	 applies	 to	 the	 whole	Union,	and;	Commission	v	Kingdom	of	Belgium,	C-374/89,	ECLI:EU:C:1991:60	for	breach	of	directive.		127	See	 for	 instance	Geradin,	D.	and	Layne-Farrar,	A.	 (2012).	EU	Competition	Law	and	Economics.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	Page	19f;	and	Jones,	A.	and	Sufrin,	B.	(2014).	EU	Competition	Law.	(Fifth	Edition).	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	Pages	34-36.	
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even been stated by the Court in the case Consten and Grundig v Commission that a measure 
that tend to distort the internal market and the trade between Member States “might be such as 
to frustrate the most fundamental objectives of the Community” (emphasis added).128 
However, recent events have indicated that the abovementioned might not be the case 
anymore; as the economic and political environment have changed, so has the competition 
policy of the EU as well.  
 
It should first be stressed that the predecessors of the current Treaties held Article 3 (1) (g) 
EC,129 which stated that the activities of the Union should include “a system ensuring that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted”. In other words, the provision held the 
competition policy of the Union. However, as the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2007, 
there was no equivalent provision inserted in the text of the Treaty, but instead the new 
Protocol No. 27 was introduced. In accordance with Article 51 TEU, the protocols are an 
integral part of the Treaties, however by moving the competition policy to a protocol 
indicated that it is not as important as it once was; it was a downgrading of the legal status of 
the competition policy.130 This is supported by the fact that the Court has ruled in several 
cases, before the repeal of Article 3 (1) (g) EC, that the Article indicated a true objective of 
the Union,131 but as the competition policy was moved, it has been claimed that it is today 
rather a tool or a means used by the EU and not an objective in the sense as it once was.132 
After the introduction to Protocol No 27, it has also been argued that the competition policy in 
Article 3 (1) (g) EC was just a simple ‘means’ from the beginning as well, hence the transfer 
of the competition policy from the Treaty to the Protocol did not change anything as “an 
objective that does not exist cannot be lost”.133 It is clear that clarification and guidance is 
needed from the Court, however as of today no case law can be found on the matter. From the 
foregoing, it can be concluded that we are witnessing a weakening, or perhaps a more 
diversified version, of competition law within the legal framework of the Treaties.  																																																								128	Consten	and	Grundig	v	Commission,	Joined	cases	56	and	58-64,	ECLI:EU:C:1966:41,	para.	8.	129	First	introduced	in	the	Treaty	establishing	the	European	Community	(the	Treaty	of	Rome)	in	1957.	130	Geradin,	D.	and	Layne-Farrar,	A.	(2012).	EU	Competition	Law	and	Economics.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	 Page	 29;	 and	 Jones,	 A.	 and	 Sufrin,	 B.	 (2014).	EU	Competition	Law.	 (Fifth	 Edition).	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	Page	37.	131	See	 for	 instance	 Showa	 Denko	 KK,	 C-289/04	 P,	 ECLI:EU:C:2006:431,	 para.	 55;	 AG	 Kokott	 in	 British	
Airways	 plc	 v	 Commission,	 C-95/04,	 ECLI:EU:C:2006:133,	 para.	 68-69;	 Instituto	 Chemioterapico	 Italiano	
and	Commercial	Solvents	v	Commission,	Joined	cases	6/73	and	7/73,	ECLI:EU:C:1974:18,	para.	25.		132	Geradin,	D.	and	Layne-Farrar,	A.	(2012).	EU	Competition	Law	and	Economics.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	Page	29.	133	ibid.		
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Secondly, the EU has over the passed years worked towards becoming the leader and the role 
model for sustainable development and environmental protection. This is an argument for a 
weakening of the focus on competition within EU in itself; the focus of the EU has shifted 
towards inter alia environmental protection rather than competition and the internal market. 
This can be understood from the fact that the current Treaties hold stricter provisions relating 
to environmental protection than any other Treaty has had before. In addition, as the case law 
presented in the sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 above showed, the Court has shown a tendency of 
prioritising the environment at the cost of free competition on the internal market in certain 
areas of law which indicates a shift of the main focus of the EU. However, the Court 
alongside the other institutions of the EU have not yet provided an answer for how the 
question of how environmental policies found in the Treaties shall be merged together with 
the competition policy, but instead a case-by-case basis is applied. This method is quite 
problematic for those whom wish for the legal framework to be coherent and predictable, as it 
can never be certain when environmental protection will precede competition and vice versa.   
 
Due to that reason, the integration concept of environmental policies should to be considered. 
The integration of the environmental protection can be given a weak or a strong 
interpretation, where the weak interpretation simply implies that the institution carrying out 
the measure has to do an assessment of whether the measure is compatible with the 
environmental goals in the Treaties, but decides on its own what to do with the result of that 
assessment.134 On the other hand, a strong interpretation means the other measure should be 
adopted in order to pursue the goal of environmental protection, thus that environmental 
aspects are observed or complied with.135 Dhondt argues that the strong interpretation is the 
most suitable one to be applied in cases concerning environmental protection due to, inter 
alia, the underlying aim of the policy. He states that through the environmental provisions of 
the Treaties, an overall goal in the form of sustainable development is set out. This means that 
not only environmental protection in itself is the aim of the Articles, but also other EU 
policies such as social goals and the internal market have to be combined with environmental 
protection in order to pursue the underlying aim of sustainable development. This is due to the 
mere fact that without a functioning internal market, there is no market where environmental 
protection can be integrated. However, this does not answer the question of how the conflict 																																																								134	Dhondt,	 N.	 (2003).	 Integration	of	Environmental	Protection	 into	other	EC	Policies.	 Groningen:	 Europa	Law	Publishing.	Page	90.	135	ibid.	page	93.	
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between competition and environmental protection should be solved, which is why Dhondt’s 
discussion regarding how objectives at the same level should be handled has to be enlightened 
here as well.  
 
It has been argued that when two objectives are in conflict, one can either choose to recognise 
a specific hierarchy between the policies, or decide to give the implementing institutions 
power of discretion to decide when an objective prevails the other.136 As has already been 
stated in the foregoing, the ECJ uses a case-by-case method where it is balancing the 
conflicting objectives against each other and, based on the specific circumstances in the case 
at hand, decide which objective that should overrule the other. Hence, a test of proportionality 
and non-discrimination is applied. In addition, it can easily be seen from the case law that a 
margin of discretion has been admitted to the institutions, as no hierarchy between the 
objectives has been ruled upon. Dhondt means that when using a strong interpretation on the 
environmental protection policy, a case-by-case basis can be used and environmental 
protection does not in any way constitute an absolute, prevailing objective in all instances. 
Instead, a balance has to be found between the conflicting objectives as all of the main 
objectives of the EU, such as competition and sustainable development, are equally important. 
As a consequence, it can thus be agreed upon that a strong interpretation is to be applied when 
looking at the environmental protection policy of the EU, which means that other policies 
should not be set aside, however they should be adjusted in a way that they can pursue 
environmental protection.137 This does not entail that environmental protection should prevail 
at all times; as the aim of sustainable development requires more than the environmental 
objective to be pursued, environmental policies do sometimes have to be set aside in order for 
the overall aim to be achieved. Hence, as a strong interpretation should be applied, measures 
aiming to enhance competition have to observe or comply with the environmental standards 
as well, which thereby shows that environmental protection has been strengthen as a main 
objective of the EU.  
 
In brief, it is clear that the competition policy of the EU has been weakened in comparison to 
how it has been, whilst environmental protection is being given increased priority. In other 
words, the way of interaction of the two principles is being reviewed and developed within 
the legal system of the EU, but it is still an unsolved matter.  																																																								136	ibid.	page	95.	137	ibid.	page	96.	
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4.2	Conclusion	
From the discussions in the foregoing sections, it can be concluded that there is not only one 
main objective of the EU (which we on the other hand already knew), and it is certainly not 
only the internal market and competition that fall in the scope of what are to be seen as the 
main objectives. One explanation as to why the focus seems to be shifting may be the mere 
fact that the internal market and the competition policy have already been fully developed, or 
at least to the extent that the EU finds itself to be contented with, in contrast to the work that 
has to be done within the environmental area. Thus, it might be the case that the EU is 
working harder on the areas where the need for improvement is greater, hence the reason to 
why it might seem that the main objective in the form of the internal market has been 
downgraded. Another reason to why competition has been prioritised up to this point might be 
because competition falls in the exclusive competence of the EU in accordance with Article 3 
(1) (b) TFEU, whilst environmental protection is a shared competence between the EU and its 
Member States in accordance with Article 4 (2) (e) TFEU. It is not hard to imagine that the 
interests within the exclusive competence of the EU are given precedence over the interest 
that fall within the shared competence. Nonetheless, the most important observation from the 
analysis above is that environmental protection is no longer a subordinated goal to 
competition. In addition, it has been proven that the most suitable method to handle the 
conflict between different objectives is to apply a test of proportionality, where environmental 
aspects have to be observed and complied with as long as it does not make it impossible to 
pursue the other objectives of the Union.    
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5. Interim	Conclusion	
From the analyses above, several conclusions can be drawn that are crucial for two reasons; 
firstly, it is important for the understanding of why the MEIP has to be amended, and 
secondly how the alternative to the MEIP should be designed.  
 
To begin with, it can be stated that the current MEIP is not designed to be applied in cases 
where the State acts as a purchaser. The State cannot, and should not, take only micro-
economic aspects into consideration when carrying out public procurement procedures. The 
situations regarding public tender procedures differ to such a great extent that it cannot be 
compared to cases where the State acts as an investor. When the State acts as an investor, it is 
understandable that there is a requirement of the State should act in the same way as a private 
investor would have done, due to the impact on the market in the form of distorted 
competition. When the State acts as an investor, it is not operating in its function as a State 
but instead investments and similar measures are taken in order to generate profit. However, 
when the State acts as a purchaser, there are elements demonstrating that the role of a State in 
a public procurement procedure is of both an investor and a public authority. This makes a 
pure comparison to a private investor deceptive, and thereby providing a (to some extent) 
‘false’ result in the form of the MEIP being failed. In other words, the comparison to a market 
investor in cases where the State acts as a purchaser will be unfair as the comparison is not 
made with an equivalent subject. Thus, the MEIP has to be amended.  
 
Secondly, the MEIP will only accept measures that are based upon commercial, micro-
economic considerations, which makes the test static due to the fact that it does not adapt to 
the development of the market. Environmental protection has begun to find its way within the 
scope of the private investors’ objectives, however that is only done due to the fact that 
pursuing environmental goals as a private investor today will generate profit. As the demand 
of the market varies over time, it would create legal uncertainty if environmental aspects were 
deemed to be included in the concept of micro-economic aspects and therefore in the 
assessment of the MEIP, as this would open up for other trends to be included in the MEIP as 
well; hence, making the outcome of the MEIP assessment unforeseeable and unpredictable. 
However, environmental protection is still an obligation that the Member States have to 
consider, but environmental protection is not of micro-economic nature and cannot be 
pursued with the current MEIP. Thus, the MEIP has to be amended.  
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Thirdly, a shift of what, or which, objective that is the main one of the EU has been observed. 
This is based on the fact that competition and the internal market have been set aside by the 
EU in favour of environmental protection on different levels of EU law; not only within the 
areas of state aid and public procurement, but also within competition law in general as well 
as on Treaty level. Even though it has been pointed out that a case-by-case basis is being used 
when determining which of the two objectives that should precede the other, it is undoubtedly 
a fact that environmental protection has been given much higher priority nowadays than what 
was the case a few years ago. In other words, environmental protection is definitely an 
objective that can challenge, and sometimes prevail over, the strong objective of free 
competition. But in order for it to do so, certain tools that are designed in a way to only 
preserve competition, and the internal market has to be altered in order for them to reflect 
how the objectives de facto looks today. Thus, the MEIP has to be amended.  
 
If the MEIP does not change, the environmental obligations in the Treaties and in the 
Directive will be hampered as to what regards award criteria; by deeming the use of green 
clauses in a public procurement procedure as to be state aid in the meaning of Article 107 (1) 
TFEU would have several negative, and unwanted, effects. To begin with, it would mean that 
the Member States would have to notify the Commission every single time a public 
procurement procedure is carried out, which in itself is understandable to have negative 
effects as this would place a double burden on the procuring entities in the form of the 
notification requirement, as well as complying with the rules stemming from the Directive. 
Also, it would probably be practically impossible, or at least extremely hard, for the 
Commission to handle the amount of work that the notification requirement of each public 
procurement procedure carried out would result in, due to the large amount of public 
procurement procedures that are being conducted each year in all Member States. This could 
then result in either limiting the liberalisation of the public service sector within the EU, or 
impeding Member States from using green clauses at all, as the procedures that would follow 
from the use of environmental criteria would be too extensive and time-consuming for the 
procuring entities. Thus, the MEIP has to be amended. 
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6. The	 Alternative:	 Replace	 the	 MEIP	 with	 the	 Purchaser	Principle	
In order to do a correct assessment of whether a benefit or advantage has been conferred on 
an undertaking from the State in a case concerning the use of environmental award criteria in 
a public procurement procedure, it should first be stated that the assessment has to include 
aspects of both micro- and macro-economic nature. In contrast to how the MEIP is applied 
today, it is submitted that the assessment should not be done simply through a comparison to 
a private economic operator due to the mere fact that there is no private subject that can be 
used as a fair comparison. Hence, the proposal below differs from other suggestions to how 
public procurement cases should be assessed under the state aid rules, where the majority tries 
to modify the existing MEIP to suit cases concerning public procurement and secondary 
criteria.138 After the analyses carried out above, it has been concluded that the MEIP has to be 
amended, however this chapter will take that conclusion one step further by suggesting that 
the MEIP should be removed in cases concerning tender procedures and instead be replaced 
with a completely new test which will assess if a benefit or advantage is at hand in a different 
way than how this is done in cases concerning other measures; the Purchaser Principle. This is 
due to the mere fact that, as has been provided for several times before, a situation regarding 
public tender procedure is different to such a great extent that it cannot be handled in the same 
way as for instance a case where a loan is given from the State, or when the case concerns a 
pure investment from the State to the undertaking.  
6.1	The	Purchaser	Principle	
The Purchaser Principle that will be explained below contains a three-step assessment, where 
factors that are conformed for purchase situations are embraced. Thus, it is submitted that the 
new test should include the following assessments: 
 
1. Is there a need for the purchase? 
2. What is the most economically advantageous tender? 
3. Is the measure proportional? 																																																								138	See	 for	 instance	 Arrowsmith,	 S.	 and	 Kunzlik,	 P.	 (2009).	 Social	 and	 Environmental	 Policies	 in	 EC	
Procurement	 Law.	 Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press.	 Pages	 249-270;	 Doern,	 A.	 (2004).	 The	
Interaction	Between	EC	Rules	on	Public	Procurement	and	State	Aid.	Public	Procurement	Law	Review.	3.97.	Pages	10-12	and;	 Steiniche,	M.	 (2012).	Competitive	Neutrality	–	Critical	Remarks.	 Copenhagen:	 Jurist-	og	Økonomforbundets	Forlag.	Pages	453-468	in	Festskrift	til	Jens	Fejø,	whom	argues	that	a	market	economy	purchaser	principle	should	be	introduced	in	order	to	handle	cases	as	such.		
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Firstly, it should be pointed out that the Purchaser Principle should only replace the MEIP in 
cases concerning public procurement procedures; thus the new test is not designed to be used 
in any other case than when a public tender has been conducted. It should also be stressed that 
the Purchaser Principle is meant to be used in the same way as the MEIP is today, namely that 
it should be used as a test that is introduced through case law by the ECJ. Ergo, it should not 
be codified through legislation, as a principle as such should be easy to amend or remove, 
which stands in relation to the fact that the test should be flexible and shaped after how the 
market de facto looks like. A codification of a test as such could result in the same problems 
as we are facing with the MEIP today, viz. that it would not reflect how the market actually 
looks like as well as it would be static and compelled to what aspects that can be included in 
the assessment in a different way than it would be if it is implemented through case law. 
Thus, rulings in cases before the Court will form the most suitable test because judgments 
from the Court reflect de facto markets and actions taken by market participants as the 
judgments derive from the circumstances in the case, which will therefore result in a test that 
will provide a fair, true result, i.e. if a benefit or advantage has been conferred on the 
undertaking or not. It is also important to point out that this has to be done by the ECJ due to 
reasons regarding harmonisation of the application of the test in the different Member States, 
as well as this falls within the exclusive competence of the EU as it concerns competition 
rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market in accordance with Article 3 (1) (b) 
TFEU mentioned above.  
 
The question above concerns how the Purchaser Principle should be introduced, designed and 
where it should have its legal basis. However, it should also be pointed out that the new test 
will, in the same way as the MEIP, be applied not only by the Union Courts, but also by the 
Commission as well as the national courts when it is necessary. The question regarding 
whether the national courts, or the courts in general, are competent and/or suitable for this 
assessment will be discussed in section 6.5, where also other problems that may derive from 
the new principle will be touched upon. In the following, each element of the Purchaser 
Principle will be explained and examined further.  
6.1.1	Is	there	an	actual	need	for	the	purchase?		
By examining the actual need for the purchase, it will be easy to determine whether the 
purchase is motivated from a purely economic perspective, which will therefore satisfy the 
need of an assessment including micro-economic aspects. Also, it will show whether the State 
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has operated to carry out its function or business, or if it is done in order to give an advantage 
or benefit to an undertaking. As has been discussed in section 3.1.1, the GC actually looked at 
the ‘actual need’ of the purchase in the case BAI, however they did not use it in a way that 
changed the assessment done under the MEIP of whether a benefit or advantage was at hand. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the ‘actual need’ test is a component that is necessary in 
order for the assessment to be complete.  
 
When looking at if the purchase was motivated from an economical point of view, a 
comparison can be made to how a private purchaser should have done. In relation to the 
foregoing, regarding the fact that there is no equivalent subject that can serve as a suitable 
comparison to a purchasing State, it should be noted that the comparison is only one 
component out of many others, hence it is not decisive to the extent that it would rule out the 
possibility of taking environmental aspects into consideration in the assessment. In addition, 
the comparison should only examine the ‘actual need’, which would therefore not cover all 
aspects of a private purchaser (as is done in the current MEIP). For example, a prudent private 
purchaser would only buy as many shirts as was needed in order to carry out the business. If 
the State operates in the same way, hence purchasing shirts that will serve a purpose for the 
business of the State, the first part of the test will be passed. Yet, it should be stressed that 
when assessing if there is an actual need of the purchase, it is only the economic factors that 
should be regarded. This means that the assessment should only include the commercial 
nature of the purchase, for instance if the quantity purchased corresponds to the actual need of 
the public authority. Hence, what the specific good or service purchased is should not be 
given too much weighing in the assessment. However, this is only one out of three 
components of the test, and because the State can prove that an actual need for the purchased 
good or service does not in itself mean that no benefit or advantage has been conferred on an 
undertaking. It also has to be examined if the selected undertaking is the correct one. Hence, 
this part of the new test focuses on components concerning the purchased object, whereas the 
next part of the test looks at the subject from which the purchase has been done.   
6.1.2	What	is	the	most	economically	advantageous	tender?	
The second aspect that should be assessed in order to determine if the undertaking receives an 
advantage or benefit from the State is to determine if the chosen tenderer is the most 
economically advantageous one. By doing so, an objective assessment of the choice of 
undertaking will be done, which will serve as a presumption that a benefit has not been 
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conferred on the undertaking because the award criteria has been applied to all submitted 
tenderers, thus proving that none has been given a benefit. The assessment would be done in 
the same way as it is carried out under Article 67 of the Directive, which means that the State 
can chose to award a tenderer on various criteria, as long as the criteria is linked to the subject 
matter of the contract. It is clear that the price will be a determining factor in the assessment, 
as the most economically advantageous offer naturally includes the lowest price. However, 
the Court has stated that the concept of the most economically advantageous tender does not 
only include aspects of purely economic nature such as price, but environmental aspects falls 
into the scope of the concept as well.139 This will once again satisfy the need of taking both 
micro-economic as well as macro-economic aspects into account, as the price paid for a good 
or service is a micro-economic aspect that is in direct correlation to the profit of the business 
of the State, whilst the environmental aspects are of macro-economic nature.  
 
In addition, it should be recalled that it is the effect of the measure that is the crucial 
component of whether a measure is regarded as state aid or not. By evaluating the different 
tenderers from a ‘most economically advantageous’ perspective, the effect will be easier to 
detect. For example, if a green clause is used as an award criterion in a public procurement 
procedure, it is easy to find out what the effect of the green clause will be as a comparison can 
be made between the points that have been awarded to the undertakings that do comply with 
the green clause and the points of the undertakings that do not. The result from the 
comparison will then be evaluated by means of a proportionality test, which leads us to the 
final component of the new test.  
6.1.3	Is	the	measure	proportional?		
It should first be pointed out that the need of a new test is not based on the fact that 
environmental aspects should always precede competition. Competition is an important tool 
to enhance environmental protection as well. If the market demands environmental friendly 
goods, free competition will make sure that only the economic operators whom supply that 
will remain on the market. In addition, competition is such an important objective as well as a 
cornerstone of the EU that it would be practically impossible to even argue that competition 
should always be set aside for environmental protection; neither the competition nor the 
																																																								139	Concordia	C-513/99,	 ECLI:EU:C:2002:495	 para.	 57.	 This	 also	 includes	 other	 criteria	 such	 as	 quality,	delivery	date,	 technical	merit	 and	cost-effectiveness.	 See	Sánchez	Graells,	A.	 (2011).	Public	Procurement	
and	the	EU	Competition	Rules.	United	Kingdom:	Hart	Publishing.	Page	310f.	
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environment would gain on that approach. However, environmental considerations have to be 
taken due to all the foregoing reasons that have been presented above. Thus, a proportionality 
test is the most suitable way in order to determine to what extent one of the objectives may 
interfere with the other. The test should examine if the ‘cost’ of the distortion of competition 
is in proportion to the environmental ‘profit’ gained. The practical application of the test 
would be divided into two parts, suitability and necessity, which is based on the classical 
proportionality test used by the EU.140  
 
First, a suitability test should be carried out, where the measure at hand is examined in 
relation to the outcome of the measure. The measure will in this case be the use of secondary 
criteria, and these can only be used to the extent that it reflects the actual improvement of the 
protection of the environment. For example, the green clause cannot be a requirement that is 
not relevant, or in other words that is not a suitable or legitimate aim for what the public 
procurement concerns, as well as it cannot be given a too high weighting if the environmental 
effects are low. This should then be assessed in relation to what the damage on the 
competition has been. In other words, it must be reasonable. For instance, is the award 
criterion in the form of a zero-pollution requirement with a weighting of 75% in a tender 
regarding a purchase of one car legitimate? Probably not, due to the fact that there are not as 
many undertakings that can supply that type of car to a reasonable price and will therefore 
distort competition to a greater extent than what other alternatives that will have a higher, yet 
not devastating, effect on the environment would have. Secondly, the proportionality 
assessment should look at the actual necessity of the measure. Is the use of the secondary 
criteria in form of environmental protection necessary in order for environmental protection to 
be achieved, or is there another way to accomplish the same goal?  
 
By using a proportionality test where competition is considered in relation to the environment, 
it is easier to see what the actual impact on both the competition on the internal market as well 
as on the environment will be with the specific measure. It is a hard assessment to do, 
however it is necessary to include a proportionality test as the two objectives cannot be 
achieved at the same time, and a test as such is the only way to weigh the two against each 
other. As mentioned earlier, the current MEIP is static in the sense that it can only pursue 
																																																								140	Bernard,	 C.	 (2013).	 The	 Substantial	 Law	 of	 the	 EU	 –	 The	 Four	 Freedoms.	 (Fourth	 Edition).	 Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	Page	177f.	
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purely micro-economic goals, however due to the great need of environmental improvement 
the test has to be more dynamic, which a proportionality assessment will provide.  
6.2	How	Would	the	Purchaser	Principle	Work	in	Practice?	
In order to provide a full understanding of the Purchaser Principle, the following section will 
illustrate an example, which is the same example used in the introductory section 2.4 but for 
the sake of convenience for the reader, the circumstances will be presented in this section as 
well.  
 
Suppose that the State decides to conduct a public tender for the purpose of purchasing 
100.000 shirts that are to be used by the personnel working at the public hospitals. The State 
further decides to impose an award criterion with the weighting of 50% relating to the total 
amount of recycled material used in the shirts, where 100% recycled material will give a total 
of 10 points. In addition, the State uses a price criterion weighting 50% where the points 
awarded will be dependent on the price submitted by the other offers.141 Thus, the tenderer 
that offers the lowest price will be given 10 points and the other tenderers will be given points 
in relation to that. Hence, the maximum points that can be awarded to an undertaking are 20 
points.  
 
First, the actual need of the purchase should be assessed. In this case, the actual need is 
examined by looking at how many people that are working at the hospitals. If there are 
100.000 workers, there is an actual need for the purchase. Consequently, the purchase is 
motivated from a commercial standpoint due to the fact that a private purchaser would have 
bought the shirts as well since it is needed in order for the business to be carried out.  
 
Secondly, it has to be assessed whether the chosen tenderer is the most economically 
advantageous one. It should first be established that the environmental award criterion should 
be deemed to be linked to the subject matter of the contract as the criterion is posed in a way 
that it relates to the quality of the product as well as the specific process of production.142 
When carrying out the assessment at hand, the different prices that the tenderers offer should 																																																								141	There	 are	 several	 problems	 to	 this	method	 of	 awarding	 points	 of	 price	which	will	 not	 be	 discussed	further	here,	however	as	it	is	the	most	common	one	it	will	be	used	in	this	example.	See	Practical	Law.	PLC	
–	Evaluation	of	tenders.	Accessed	10	November	2015.		<http://uk.practicallaw.com/2-386-8761?service=publicsector#a406015>.	142	In	accordance	with	Article	67.2	and	3	of	the	Directive.	
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be compared, in addition to if the shirts actually are produced from recycled material. If there 
are two tenderers that offer the right amount of shirts that has been produced from 100% 
recycled material, the price will be the decisive factor to which of the two that constitutes the 
most economically advantageous tender. However, if one of the offers comprises 100.000 
shirts made of 100% recycled material to a price of 100.000 EUR, whilst the other tenderer 
can only offer shirts made of 20% recycled material, but to a price of 50.000 EUR, the 
depending factor will be the weighting of the green clause in relation to the weighting of the 
price. In this example, the tender that can supply 100.000 shirts of recycled material would be 
awarded with most points, as it will get full points on the environmental criterion (100% = 10 
points) and 5 points for the price (50.000 = 10 points, hence the doubled price equals to 5 
points), whilst the second tenderer will only receive 2 points for the environmental criterion 
(20% out of 100% equals to one fifth, 10/5 = 2) and 10 points for the price, due to the fact that 
it was the lowest tender. To summarise, tenderer number one would be awarded 15 points and 
tenderer number two would be given 12 points, hence tenderer number one will be awarded 
the contract since it is the most economically advantageous tender. Consequently, if tenderer 
number one is chosen, the second criterion of the Purchaser Principle will be passed as well.  
 
Thirdly, the proportionality test should be applied to the example. In this case, it should first 
be determined if the environmental award criterion is a suitable measure to be used in order to 
achieve the environmental goals set forth in the Directive and the Treaties, by looking at what 
the actual criterion consists of and how much weighting it has been given. The actual criterion 
used should be deemed suitable, as it is legitimate for a public authority to require that the 
materials should be environmentally friendly. In addition, a weighting of 50% should also be 
deemed suitable, based on the case law from the Court,143 as well as looking at the specific 
circumstances in the case where the material used in the production of the shirts is of great 
relevance from an environmental point of view. Thus, the impact on the environment would 
be greater than what the damage on the competition would be, as the requirement is not posed 
in an excessive way in addition to the fact that the harmful effect on the environment if the 
100.000 shirts were not environmentally friendly could be huge. Thus, the measure is in this 
case suitable. Moving on to the necessity of the green clause in the example, the question 
regarding if the environmental obligation could be fulfilled in any other way has to be 
answered. As has already been mentioned, the requirement in this case is closely connected to 																																																								143	See	section	4.2.1.	
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the subject-matter of the contract, as well as it has a measurable effect in the form of the harm 
of the environment caused by non-recycled material in the production in contrast to the effect 
of the recycled material. As a result, it can be stated that the measure chosen in order to 
achieve the environmental obligation imposed on the Member States is necessary; there is no 
other way that would be more suitable than the chosen one. From this, it can be concluded 
that the environmental advantages deriving from the use of the environmental award criterion 
is proportional to the distortion caused on the competition.   
 
In conclusion, the green clauses used in the example passes the Purchaser Principle and hence 
no benefit or advantage is at hand, and therefore state aid is ruled out as the four criteria in 
Article 107 (1) TFEU are cumulative.  
6.3	Potential	Problems	with	the	Purchaser	Principle	
In the analysing chapters, some of the many problems of the MEIP have been clarified and 
discussed, and even though the Purchaser Principle contains different solutions to the majority 
of these problems, there are also some problems with the new test. Thus, some of the major 
risks shall be examined in the following section.  
6.3.1	The	Purchaser	Principle	contains	a	more	extensive	assessment	
The new test proposes a three-step assessment in order to decide whether a benefit or 
advantage is at hand, which in comparison to the one assessment done under the MEIP is 
considered to be far more extensive. A more extensive assessment implies that more time will 
have to be spent on carrying out the assessment, which in the context of EU law is a negative 
factor as the procedures already are considered to be too long. In addition, a more extensive 
assessment also involves a de facto harder assessment in comparison to the MEIP; there are 
more factors that should be taken into account, which increases the potential risk of mistakes 
being made in the assessment, thereby increasing the risk of reaching different results. 
However, it has to be remembered that a more extensive assessment also carries the benefit of 
being more flexible, which is crucial in order to obtain a fair result of the assessment.  
6.3.2	The	risks	following	from	the	application	of	the	Purchaser	Principle		
As the test is required to be flexible it has to look at various factors, hence several 
assessments has to be done in order to provide a fair result. This might entail a risk that the 
test will be applied differently in the different legal orders, especially as to what regards the 
proportionality assessment. This is due to the fact that if there is no guidance on the matter, or 
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if the Member States are given a wide margin of discretion, the assessment may easily 
become arbitrary, as it is possible that the goal of integrating environmental protection into 
the areas of state aid and public procurement might be seen as a burden for the Member States 
as it also carries costs. This leads us to the next problem in the scope of application of the 
Purchaser Principle, namely that it will be hard to determine what margin of discretion that 
should be given to the Member States. The balance between harmonisation on one side, and 
the need of flexibility on other side, is a hard assessment to do. This is an extremely important 
issue to remember when implementing the Purchaser Principle, as one of the aims of 
removing the MEIP is to create a coherent, foreseeable legal environment in relation to the 
state aid rules. In addition, it will be hard for the EU to control how these assessments will be 
carried out in the different Member States. Thus, it is my suggestion that the CJEU leaves 
some margin of discretion to the institutions that are to apply the Purchaser Principle in order 
to satisfy the need of flexibility, however that it should be limited to the extent that 
harmonisation in the application of the principle can still be accomplished.    
6.3.3	The	Courts	are	not	a	suitable	tool	to	use	when	shaping	the	principle	
The next problem, regarding the fact that the assessment might be too complex for the Courts 
to carry out, goes hand in hand with the earlier statement that the principle should be 
introduced through case law and not through legislation. It could be the case that because the 
Purchaser Principle contains an extensive assessment, as well as there will be some margin of 
discretion for the institutions to decide exactly what factors that should be included Purchaser 
Principle, the new test is actually too complex for the Courts to carry out and that the 
assessments should be codified instead of being carried out by the Courts in order for the 
assessment to be legally certain and harmonised. However, as has been argued for in the 
introductory part to this chapter, it is in my view clear that the Courts are competent as well as 
the most suitable tool to implement the new test as that will result in a flexible and desirable 
test as the cases before the Courts reflect the real market, hence resulting in a realistic, 
substantial test. However, it is still a potential risk to demand the Courts to form the principle.   
6.3.4	The	question	has	not	been	settled	for	political	reasons	
Another potential problem with the new test is that the reason to why the EU has not amended 
the MEIP is due to environmental political reasons; it might be the fact that questions as such 
should not be settled on the legal arena, but instead it should be handled by the politicians as a 
legal solution to the matter might have undesirable consequences. For instance, by making 
environmental protection a legal matter to the extent that the new solution proposes, it (to 
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some extent) codifies a political view which exists today but that might not exist, or perhaps 
will not look the same, tomorrow. Thus, a potential problem with the introduction of the 
Purchaser Principle is that it implies a codification of an objective in a legal area that, from a 
political standpoint, might be undesirable.  
6.3.5	Potential	problems	with	the	three	criteria	of	the	Purchaser	Principle	
Last but not least, the assessments that should be done under the different criteria may involve 
problems as well. To begin with, the ‘actual need’ assessment done under the first step of the 
Purchaser Principle is due to the nature of the test hard to measure and therefore to control 
and assess for the Courts. This might cause problems relating to harmonisation144 as well as 
the applicability of the test in itself; if the assessment cannot be carried out in a way that is 
quantifiable, the result from it will thereby not be the fair, true outcome that the new test is 
striving to achieve. Thus, a requirement to provide evidence in order to support the actual 
need of the purchase might have to be set high. However, this can also result in a negative 
outcome; if there really is an actual need but it is not measurable in any way it might be 
deemed to constitute a benefit or advantage, hence not being a true picture of reality, which is 
one of the aims of the Purchaser Principle. Moreover, when it comes to deciding which one is 
the most economically advantageous tenderer, it is still uncertain how far the environmental 
criteria can be used in a public tender, which might cause problem for the Purchaser Principle. 
For example, it has not been ruled upon how much weighting an environmental criterion can 
be given in order to comply with the Articles in the public procurement Directive, which 
would of course be a potential problem with the new test as this makes the assessment hard to 
make for the Courts. As to what regards the proportionality test, it has already been 
mentioned that some of the difficulties may be to determine how wide the margin of 
discretion should be for the administrating institutions that shall apply the test, in addition to 
the problem relating to harmonisation. In relation to the foregoing risks, it should however be 
pointed out that it is a three-step assessment, thus failing one of the criteria does not 
automatically result in the measure constituting a benefit or advantage in the meaning of 
Article 107 (1) TFEU. Hence, the potential risks of each criterion should be observed in 
isolation.  
																																																								144	Please	see	section	6.5.2.	
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6.4	Final	Remarks	
In conclusion, it should be stated that even though the new test might have some difficulties 
and potential risks, it is important that the new principle is shaped in a way that objectives 
such as environmental protection can be integrated in the assessment. When looking at the 
MEIP, it is clear that it is unsuitable to only assess one component of the measure (meaning 
the micro-economic aspect of the measure in this regard). Instead, it is necessary to introduce 
a test that allows the Courts to weigh different objectives against each other, both of micro- 
and macro-economic nature, in order for the test to provide a fair result of whether the 
measure actually confers a benefit or advantage on the undertaking. An assessment as such 
will naturally have its disadvantages and potential problems as well, however those problems 
will not be problematic to the same extent as the problems found when looking at the MEIP. 
Thus, the Purchaser Principle should replace the current MEIP in cases where the State has 
acted as a purchaser.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 	 59	
7. Conclusion	
Through the introduction of environmental obligations in the Treaties and in the Directive, a 
new legal landscape has emerged; Member States as well as the EU are today obliged to take 
environmental considerations into account when a public procurement procedure is 
conducted. Environmental protection is still considered to be a macro-economic objective, 
and as the MEIP only includes aspects of micro-economic nature, the use of secondary 
criteria in the form of environmental protection as award criteria will automatically classify 
the criteria as a benefit or advantage, thus deeming the measure to be state aid in the scope of 
Article 107 (1) TFEU. As a result, it has been concluded that the MEIP is no longer a suitable 
test to use when carrying out the assessment of whether a measure constitutes a benefit or 
advantage, and frankly it has actually never been an adequate test to apply on cases 
concerning public procurement procedures. This is due to the fact that it was designed to 
compare the action of the State to an investor, and not a purchaser, which in itself has been 
problematic throughout the years as different elements are assessed when the case concerns 
an investment than in a situation that regards a purchase. In addition, there are several 
negative effects of deeming the use of green clauses in a public procurement to be state aid, 
for instance it would place a double procedural burden on the procuring Member States as 
they would have to notify the Commission before carrying out a tender procedure, as well as 
they have to comply with the rules set forth in the Directive, which could result in the 
Member States not using environmental criteria at all.  
 
Ultimately, it is clear that a change is needed when it comes to assessing the first criterion of 
Article 107 (1) TFEU; a principle that was introduced 30 years ago can impossibly be the 
most suitable principle due to the fact that the market, the goals and objectives of the EU and 
its Member States, and the world as a whole have changed tremendously during these years. 
This requires the test to change as well, especially as it is of great importance for the 
environment that it does. The regime of state aid covers a broad range of measures, as well as 
the contracts distributed through public procurement procedures amount to almost one fifth of 
the Member States’ GDP, thus it is not hard to understand how the integration of 
environmental concerns is one of the key factors that should be regarded in order for the 
environmental obligations to be fulfilled. Hence, the change has to be substantial in order for 
it to have any effect, which motivates a replacement of the current MEIP with a completely 
new test. An alteration of the already existing principle would probably create new problems 
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rather than solving the old ones, due to the fact that the MEIP cannot pursue other goals than 
those of purely micro-economic nature. Thus, a test that is flexible and that can include both 
micro- and macro-economic considerations is needed; where inter alia profit, efficiency, 
environmental aspects and other desirable objectives can be achieved at the same time. The 
Purchaser Principle allows objectives of both micro- and macro-economic aspects to be 
regarded, in addition to the fact that it is designed to be applied in cases where the State acts 
as a purchaser and not as an investor. It also allows the Courts to assess the measure on a 
case-by-case basis, where the proportionality aspect of the test satisfies the need of Courts to 
weigh the different objectives against each other, thus being able to consider both the 
competition on the internal market as well as environmental protection aspects, hence 
complying with the principle of sustainable development. In other words, the Purchaser 
Principle allows the regimes of state aid and public procurement to be de facto measures that 
can be used in order to accomplish the goals for a sustainable development, as the new test 
removes some of the major problems with the implementation of environmental protection in 
the legal frameworks caused by the MEIP.  
 
The Member States of the EU, in addition to the EU itself, have an obligation to ensure that 
the environment is considered and protected. In contrast to the responsibility to maintain a 
level playing field on the internal market, the environmental obligation has a more complex 
purpose and scope, as it is a concern for the current generation as well as future generations in 
the whole world. It is therefore of great importance that environmental protection is integrated 
in, among other areas, state aid and public procurement. Indeed, the MEIP has served its 
purpose well, however it is now time for the introduction of a new test that corresponds to 
present circumstances.  
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